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Accommodating approximately 70 million tons of commercial traffic annually, the 
Melvin Price Locks and Dam 26 is the largest of its kind on the Mississippi River.
Melvin Price Locks and Dam replaced Lock and Dam 26, which was demolished in 
1990. Almost from the beginning, Lock and Dam 26 was plagued with structural defi-
ciencies. Scour holes developed below the dam. This was of particular concern because 
some of the holes were deeper than the wooden pilings supporting the dam. The 
scouring of the riverbed led to the disintegration of the concrete and a loss of founda-
tion material, which eventually resulted in excessive deflections and settlement of the 
lock walls and dam piers.
The construction of the Melvin Price Locks and Dam constituted the first replacement 
of an original installation of the 9-Foot Channel Project. The new structure is located 
two miles downstream of the razed Lock and Dam 26, but the significance of the new 
installation is not limited to its colossal size. Throughout its design and construction, 
the Corps engaged in an extensive program of computer-assisted design, testing and 
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vForeword 
You cannot read this remarkable document without gaining troubling insights 
into many of the challenges we as a nation face at the intersection of physical forces 
of nature with the human constructs of technology, politics and finance. Todd Shallat 
has brought these issues to us, using the lens of history to tell a series of stories that 
together illuminate our understanding of how the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has 
been a blessing and a curse to the millions of people, creatures, plants, industries and 
communities whose existence is shaped by the Mississippi River.
The central dilemma posed by Shallat in this piece is that large-scale, centralized 
technological systems, even when based on good science and sound engineering, 
could have bad consequences. Using the example of the Corps and the Mississippi, 
Shallat demonstrates that what we as a nation have built to protect us from the 
forces of nature may, in fact, lead to our increased vulnerability. It is the dilemma of 
unintended consequences. Following Hurricane Betsy, Shallat writes of “the tragedy 
of safety innovations that promote unsafe behavior, of unknowable hazards and 
unintended effects.”
This is a highly personal document. Shallat is a participant, not just an observer. 
He weaves his personal experience and insights along with other participants, citing 
many interviews he has had over the years. He supports these personal observations 
with a combination of historical scholarship and archival research. But this is an essay 
in the true meaning of the word. It is not an academically focused history. Rather, it is 
written for the concerned citizen, be they environmentalist, engineer, or politician, to 
be able to better understand the physical issues confronting this important part of our 
world. The role of public works infrastructure as part of the problem and the solution 
is a central issue.
 Some will most certainly find this essay troubling. Shallat does not pull punches, 
offering facts to challenge those on the right and the left politically. Even more so, he 
challenges many of the assumptions many of us make about the environment, the 
role of government and the ability of engineers to use science and technology to the 
benefit of humanity without costs that could be catastrophic. 
 Howard Rosen, Ph.D.
 Department of Engineering Professional Development
 University of Wisconsin-Madison
 Past President, Public Works Historical Society (2004-2006)
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" . . . And nature must obey necessity." 
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act IV, Sc. 3 
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Preface 
Always, like the Great Mississippi, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been a 
conduit of hope and fear and scientific conjecture, of faith in American progress and 
terror of what progress has wrought. Always the Engineers have shouldered much of 
the credit and blame for massively spectacular projects. Always, since the 1820s, when 
the agency emerged as a builder and broker on the Mississippi, the Corps has enlisted 
science in the service of waterway engineering that defenders call monumental and 
detractors call grandiose. 
My involvement began in the aftermath of Earth Day when the Corps, said a 
famous critic, was the environment’s “public enemy number one.” The critic, quoted 
in the magazine Playboy in 1969, was Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Ten 
years later and eight blocks from Douglas’s courthouse, on Massachusetts Avenue 
in Washington, D.C., I labored on a dissertation about engineering traditions in the 
Corps office of history in Washington, D.C. The dissertation led to a book that Corps 
insiders applauded and elsewhere denounced. One intelligent reader was General 
Robert Flowers of the Corps’ Lower Mississippi Valley Division (since expanded 
northward to include the upper valley). Flowers admired the book but claimed I had 
understated the depths of the Corps’s commitment to environmental protection. 
Would I visit the Corps in Vicksburg and tour the river up close? Corps historian 
Michael Robinson, who worked closely with Flowers, arranged for a sabbatical grant. 
Tragically, in 1998, Robinson died of heart failure. Two years into the project, with 
four of five chapters complete, the research was suspended. Chapters and excepts were 
published in a dozen places—in online exhibits on the Vicksburg division’s web page, 
in Technology and Culture, Illinois Heritage, The Military Engineer, and Craig Colten’s 
edited volume of New Orleans essays published in 2001.
Hope for the Dammed retrieves three regional parts of the 1990s research. Moving 
north against the current, and metaphorically against the flow of my own assumptions 
about the Corps on the Mississippi, the study extends from the Head of Passes to the 
locks of St. Louis. It sojourns in places besieged and bitterly contested—in St. Bernard 
Parish below New Orleans where swampers blame the rising ocean on shipping; 
in Louisiana’s Atchafalaya and Yazoo’s cotton plantations; in the dredged aquatic 
freightway of the Corps’ slackwater dams.
Much has happened on the river since Robinson’s passing, and much of what 
has happened has validated the study’s original purpose and flow. Six years before 
Katrina it was bluntly stated in these pages that New Orleans would be devastated. 
Twelve years before the BP disaster it was clear that the Corps, our hired scapegoat, 
would be targeted by fear of rising oceans and costly dependence on oil. As for the 
premise that launched this study—the assumption that the Engineers, like sinners 
reborn, went green in wake of Earth Day—the findings are inconclusive. No single 
mission or politician has ever governed the Corps on the Mississippi where each of 
the six construction districts takes on a character of its own. The New Orleans district 
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rightly keeps its focus on marsh restoration and flooding. The Corps in St. Paul 
takes justifiable pride in recreation and tourism parks. Even on the same floor of a 
single building it is possible to find a confusion of conflicting viewpoints. At district 
headquarters in St. Louis, where I visited the blue-cubicled applied engineering center, 
a hydrologist expounded on the vital importance of lock-and-dam expansion. Down 
the linoleum hall, in the office of environmental compliance, a Corps biologist with 
equal passion defended the pallid sturgeons endangered by dams. 
The Corps, I was reminded, was Sibyl with a thousand faces. Its story had shifted 
in my retelling from engineering achievement to the study of politics and cultural 






Geologists call it subsidence. Swampers say the salt marsh  trembles and floats 
where the toe of Louisiana slips toward Havana, bleeding soil from 31 states. Layers of 
compacted mud weigh down the butter-soft lowlands. Ponds become estuaries. Barrier 
islands erode, exposing beachfront. Shore migrates and so does the mile-wide river that 
carved in its time five paths to the ocean. Curling and coiling like a snake in a sand 
box, the Mississippi giveth and taketh away: it fans alluvial silt then leaps to a new 
location . . . building, destroying. No dam or system of levees can hold a mudscape in 
motion. Yet hold we must for the sake of 2.1 million Louisianans on 3.3 million acres 
of marshland, for the nation’s largest fin and shell fishery, for nine ports, 3,000 miles 
of shipping channels and 16,000 miles of pipelines, for 70 percent of the winged 
commuters on the Great Mississippi Flyway, for 15 percent of America’s oil and 20 
percent of its natural gas.1  
The Mississippi braids through Arkansas-Louisiana, 1844. (U.S. Mississippi River Commission) 
2Holding Louisiana predates the Louisiana Purchase as a scientific focus of levee 
and waterway engineering. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, founded in 1802, sent 
the Frenchman Simon Bernard to the passes south of New Orleans soon after the War 
of 1812. The Corps has since defended the Lower Mississippi from foreign invasion 
and Confederate rebellion, from snags that impaled the steamboats, from hurricanes 
and floods. As Louisiana recedes, however, the agency confronts a conundrum beyond 
the dam-it, ditch-it tradition: how to let the world’s third-ranking river approximate 
the rhythms of nature—to meander and spread its mud blanket across a collapsing 
delta, to nourish without disrupting navigation or risking a serious flood. Corps levees 
block the silt needed to replenish the lowlands. Corps dredging loosens the land by 
killing freshwater plants. Floodgates and reservoirs further aggravate marsh subsidence, 
yet to abandon these kinds of projects would be to court economic disaster. To build as 
before would be to permit a catastrophe worse. 
Like vengeance rained down on a state known to resist swamp regulation in a 
nation that plows and paves about 800,000 wet acres each year, the tragedy of the 
marsh has become, as the Secretary of Interior put it, “the single most important 
environmental issue of our times.”2   And it’s not just a coastal problem. Upriver 
where the sweetgums grow and cattails spread in the shallows, the flood-protected 
long for the grassy streams once braided through sodden hardwoods: in Minnesota 
where urban sewage and PCBs have poisoned backwater marshland; in Missouri where 
navigation dikes have quickened sedimentation; in Kentucky and Tennessee where 
the clearing of flood-prone creeks has aggravated forest erosion; in Arkansas where 
farming behind federal levees has decimated flood-swept woodlands; in Louisiana 
where the river below Baton Rouge is a sewer for chemical toxins; in Mississippi where 
the draining of the Yazoo delta has replaced a watery land with furrows of cotton and 
soybeans—a bad habitat for songbirds and heron, a threat to the nesting and resting of 
migratory geese and ducks.3
What builders might possibly do to restore America’s mainstream is a 
technological quandary clouded by foreboding and doubt. So jaded are expectations. 
So grim is the national fear of what engineers might yet do to nature that it is hard 
to imagine the serious battle against engineering’s most harmful effects. Yet the 
Corps swings with the nation. Pliant and decentralized, the waterway organization 
answers mostly to Congress; also to the President, the Secretary of the Army, the 
courts, regional commissions, public opinion, the laws of physics and finance, and the 
agency’s own historical sense of organizational purpose. Critics say that inner direction 
is a bias toward massive construction. Defenders say the Corps has learned to rethink 
the meaning of river improvement as the green agenda diverts the waterway fund. 
Oystermen want freshwater diversions. Duck hunters want reedy lakes and bottomland 
hardwoods. The Mississippi Wildlife Foundation wants to preserve a riverine corridor 
for migratory fruit bats. The president of the Baton Rouge Audubon Society wants to 
reclaim green strips of healthy woodland by reflooding forests and farms.4  
“We need to be a sophisticated customer,” says wetlands advocate Mark Davis, 
formerly a franchise lawyer. “It’s carrot and stick. When they [the engineers] do it right, 
3we pat them on the head. When they do it wrong, we hit them. If engi neers don’t have 
the authority [to replenish the marsh, to protected fish and wildlife ], we’ll get it. If they 
don’t have the money, we’ll find it. They have the bulldozers. They’ve engineered us 
into this dangerous situation. We need to help them engineer a way out.”5 
Replenish or perish, but how? To unmake a fluid machine more sprawling than 
Western Europe would be an ambition beyond the store-for-the-future programs 
that Congress calls conservation. Ecologists want restoration. A 1992 report from the 
aquatic restoration committee of the Nation al Research Council targeted 10 million 
acres of impaired but repairable wetlands along 400,000 miles of over-built rivers 
and streams. Dike-notching, dam-breaching, marsh-building, and the reflooding 
of riparian farmland were hailed as effective ways to buffer human disturbance—to 
promote biodivers ity, to emulate, said the report, “a natural, self-regulating system that 
is integrated ecologically with the landscape in which it occurs.”6  Never mind that 
science remained deeply divided over how the dynamic Earth functioned in prehuman 
nature. Ecologists were convinced that biology and smart engineering could “approxi-
mate” liquid nature in its “predisturbance state.”7
Thirty-two states and two Canadian provinces drain through the world’s fourth largest river basin.   
(Army Corps of Engineers) 
4Faith in reversible nature floats through the world of the Corps on the hope that 
human contrivance can sustain enough watery chaos to keep a larger balance in place. 
For now, however, the research on restoration is soft as the nodding grasslands. What 
is the measure of human disturbance?  Given 12,000 continuous years of Mississippi 
civilization—a history of hunting with fire, of fishing with weirs, of managing water 
with drainage canals and levee-like burial mounds—how can an infant science with 
ambiguous historical data pick out a point in the past and call it pristine? It can’t, says 
historian William Cronon, an authority on the nature of nature. “Wilderness,” Cronon 
writes, “is quite profoundly a human creation—indeed, the creation of very particular 
human cultures at very particular moments in history.”8  The pristine is a cultural 
construct. No science can restore a river to the state of nature because nature—defiant, 
erratic, a mirror of our own expectations—never freezes into a state.
Nowhere is nature’s nature more elusively problematic than in the seven-state 
alluvial valley of the Lower Mississippi, home to 8.3 million people in 219 counties 
from southern Illinois to Louisiana, some of the South’s most productive soil. That 
valley, fertile, fragile, is the spout of a mud funnel that drains 1.2 million square 
miles or 41 percent of the continental United States. Soft and unstable, a rich belt of 
topsoil as deep as 50 feet, the dark alluvium spread by the river has always defined the 
valley. “Creamy and sweet-smelling” was how William Alexander Percy described the 
famous silt in Lanterns on the Levee (1941), the memoir of a patrician who pined for the 
premodern landscape yet well understood that his Mississippi cotton plantation would 
be ankle-deep in syrupy water if not for flood levees built by the Corps. For Percy the 
Historic and projected land loss in southeast Louisiana, 1932-2050. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
5river that formed the delta was “the shifting, unappeasable god of the country . . . gaunt 
and terrible . . . beautiful and dear . . . wise . . . aloof . . . an imbecile blind Titan.”9  The 
godlike prebuilt river was a murderous, magical place.
The managing of that mythic river in so many manifestations is complicated by 
the fact that ecologists and engineers, without common training or orientation, are 
professional cultures in contest with conflicting values and goals. Therein lies the 
technological challenge. Engineers crave a homeostasis of stability and predictable 
order. The Mississippi is anything but.
6CHAPTER ONE
In the Wake of Hurricane Betsy
A hurricane is a tropical furnace that draws hot air inward and up. Water vapor 
condenses, releasing energy: enough power to swirl one billion tons of moisture at 
one thousand feet per second, enough to run a 300-trillion horsepower motor or light 
and heat the United States for a year. The fury spins with a cosmic force indifferent 
to civilization, but the damage done by the storm is a function of human factors. Its 
power to kill and destroy is a variable closely dependent on human caution or daring, 
on sound or shoddy construction, on the lure of seaside housing with an open view of 
the beachfront, and on sprawling urbanization toward evermore marginal land.1
A hurricane, in short, is a thing of nature, but the disas ter it causes is not. “A 
lot of us argue that increased urbaniza tion and wealth are responsible,” says Chris 
Tucker of Emergency Preparedness Canada. “Look at Los Angeles and Mexico City and 
Vancouver with their earthquake risk, or Miami and Galveston with their hurricanes. 
. . . People don’t think about where or how they build. They just ignore the natural 
hazards.”2  People don’t think much about wood housing in a tinderbox grassland or 
condos anchored to dunes that move with the migrating coast. Even in the metropolis 
leveed between a coil of the Mississippi and hurricane swells from the Gulf, suburbia 
fills the floodplain. But the City That Care Forgot has always flirted with devastation. 
Built in a swamp, rebuilt in 1722 after a 15-hour tempest destroyed houses and sank 
warships, unscathed by the murderous flood of record in 1927, saved by a massive 
diversion through the untested Bonnet Carré Spillway in 1937, battered but spared 
again when hurricanes Flossy (1956), Carla (1961), and Hilda (1964) ravaged and 
killed nearby, New Orleans has long survived on the hope that evermore massive 
construction can sustain industrial growth. “We have spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars to protect ourselves from water,” said Louisiana Governor John J. McKeithen 
in 1965, explaining New Orleans on the eve of its greatest disaster. “We have cut the 
Mississippi in many places so the water can get faster and quicker to the gulf. We 
have built levees up and down the Mississippi. . . . We feel like now we are almost 
completely protected.”3 
Blessed with oil and gas and fortified at the tip of the world’s most sophisticated 
levee and spillways system, New Orleans seemed “almost completely protected” in the 
Kennedy-Johnson years of robust urbanization. Back when Americans had towering 
faith in monumental construction and a killer named Hurricane Betsy, on September 
9, 1965, breached the levees of Lake Pontchartrain. 
7Betsy’s Toll  
Large but shallow, a 635 square-mile blue-green sheet of tide-swept estuary with 
an average depth no deeper than a conventional basement, Lake Pontchartrain rolls 
hurricane swells from the Gulf of Mexico into southeast Louisiana about every decade 
or so. Conquis tadors searching for golden cites recorded the violence of tree-ripping 
winds on September 19, 1559, and since that time 172 hurricanes have raked coastal 
Louisiana. Thirty-eight have reached New Orleans via Lake Pontchartrain. In 1893, to 
cite the most deadly example, a day-long barrage of 30-foot swells overtopped coastal 
levees and flattened a fishing village south of New Orleans, killing 1,500. In 1915 a 
powerful storm took out a rail bridge and destroyed a lakeside farm colony, killing 
250. In 1940 a week of punishing rain marooned thousands of people, but killed 
only eight. More dangerous storms caused evermore devastation, but science and 
engineering fought back. Better roads, stronger bridges, home radios, weather radar, 
rescue helicopters, satellite tracking, each advance in the technology of evacuation 
was a victory against what had always been the most lethal of nature’s elements—the 
element of sur prise.4
The downside of those life-saving innovations was a false security that exposed 
the lakeshore suburbs to waves surging in from the Gulf. Technology was seldom an 
Hurricane Betsy, like Katrina in 2005, breached the levees of the New Orleans inner-city Industrial Canal. 
Pictured: Betsy tops the canal, September 1965.  (Times-Picayune).
8unmixed blessing; certainly not in Louisiana where the system built to funnel and 
deepen the Mississippi also prevented the river’s silt from rebuilding a fraying delta, 
where dredging and oil drilling aggravated the sinking and deterioration that inched 
New Orleans toward the Gulf. “We have defused problems by diffusing them,” wrote 
Edward Tenner of Princeton in a recent critique of technological over-dependence. 
“We have exchanged risk to human life for greater exposure to property damage, and 
then distributed the cost of that damage over space and over time. We have assumed 
an increasing burden of vigi lance along with our protection. Technology is again 
taking its revenge by converting catastrophic events into chronic conditions—even as 
natural catastrophes persist.”5
Vigilance against the routine that obscured the danger of the catastrophic made 
a record-setting disaster of Hurricane Betsy. Killing surprisingly few but causing 
remarkable damage, the storm changed little about the way engineers defended New 
Orleans. It showed, however, that good engineering could have bad consequences, that 
much of what man had built for the safety of civilization made life in an unstable city 
less stable than ever before.
Hurricane Betsy began innocently as a “nice round circular storm” off the coast of 
Venezuela.6  On August 27, 1965, the hurricane gained strength and speed as it swept 
north toward Georgia, looped back for a day over Nassau and then, looping again, 
pounded the Florida coast. On the morning of September 7, a surge off Biscayne Bay 
invaded Miami, washing eels through ornate hotels. In a day, Florida lost 90 percent 
of its avocado crop, half of its lime harvest, and windows and shutters and roofs from 
4,300 houses. Seven people died. It was “the meanest wind ever to sweep out of the 
Caribbean,” warned a teletype from the U.S. Coast Guard.7  Mean and hard to predict. 
Curving west on Septem ber 8, Betsy entered the gulf with a bead on Galveston Bay.8
“Well, those Texans will just handle that storm just like that,” the Louisiana 
governor said. Not yet a year and four months in office, John McKeithen had already 
weathered powerful Hurricane Hilda, and he doubted that misfortune would strike so 
quickly again. “It just isn’t quite fair,” he protested when Betsy seemed to be veering 
north. It was Thursday, September 9, and McKeithen was with family upstate for a 
high school football game. At 1:30 p.m. the telephone rang with an update. “This 
thing,” said a staffer in Baton Rogue, “is headed for our state.”9  
At dusk a wave thrown off the Gulf crushed Grand Isle. Breaking pipelines, 
stripping trees, killing livestock, and floating houses onto the levees or tossing them 
into the marsh, the great hurricane launched a surge that sheeted across 2.5 million 
acres. The flooded port of Venice disappeared from satellite photos. Wind gusts up 
to 170 mph twisted oilrigs and ripped anchor cables. Eleven shipwrecks blocked 30 
miles of the swollen Mississippi. There were also 46 “sunken objects” and more than 
100 smashed or grounded barges. One barge tanker went down with enough liquid 
chlorine to kill a city of 40,000 if exposed to the air. 
Drifting north with a forward speed of 20 mph, Betsy hit downtown New 
Orleans soon after nightfall on the 9th of Septem ber. Telephone poles snapped. Glass 
and twisted steel pelted Canal Street. Flooding consumed Claiborne Avenue and 
9Gentilly. Looters used scuba gear. Just before midnight a green wall of foam off Lake 
Pontchartrain entered the Industrial Canal and raced toward the Mississippi. Rising 
to twelve feet as it swept warehouses and rail yards in the lower Ninth Ward of New 
Orleans, carrying corpses and cargo and cars and finding gaps in the unfinished levees 
between the port’s inner harbor and the Parish of St. Bernard, the flood left pools 
almost as deep as the lake in suburban Arabi and Chalmette.10
“I felt something cold, looked down and there I was with water in my lap,” said a 
man who had fallen asleep at the televi sion before the tide off Pontchartrain flooded 
into Chalmette. “God it was like one giant swimming pool as far as the eye could 
see. There were people I knew—women, children, screaming, praying . . . A woman 
who lives down the block floated past me, with her two children beside her.” A father 
of eight, strength ebbing, struggled against the Pontchartrain flood with five young 
children. “I couldn’t do it,” he grieved to a Newsweek reporter. “I had to let two of 
them go.”11  
Six thousand houses sustained serious damage below the Port of New Orleans. 
Twenty thousand people barely escaped with their lives. “People waded shoulder-high 
in water with babies on their heads,” recalled a resident of the hard-hit St. Bernard 
Parish Carolyn Park subdivision.12  One man escaped by punching a hole in his ceiling, 
breaking both hands and his back. Another was saved by a plastic raincoat. “The  
winds took me,” said Eddie Ste. Marie, badly shaken. “I don’t know how high I went 
but I knew I was turning and when I come back down it [the raincoat] formed a 
parachute . . . I saw myself dying. I knew I was going to die.”13
Priests tour St. Bernard Parish, 1965. (Times-Picayune).
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It could have been worse. In 1957 a hurricane weaker than Betsy had killed 556 
when victims near St. Charles refused to evacuate. Eight years later an emergency 
plan was in place. The 4th Army stood ready with seven hundred crates of sanitation 
equipment, 1,000 drums of water, 8,571 mattress, 21,430 blankets,  and 117,000 gas 
masks. The Red Cross served 1 million cups of coffee and 500 million plates of food. 
Rescue boats rushed to the hurricane zone from as far away as Shreveport. With 
twenty coast guard helicopters and radar support from a U.S. destroyer and air force 
reconnaissance planes, the relief operation was unprecedented. Governor McKeithen 
called it “a great, great example of Americanism.” Even so, the catastrophe was unlike 
anything the delta had seen in peacetime. Injuring 17,600 people and killing 81, 
Hurricane Betsy, said McKeithen, was “the worst disaster in the state since the Civil 
War.”14   The insurance industry reeled in shock. Betsy, said an insurance spokes man, 
was “the worse natural disaster in [the history of] America—greater even than the 1906 
San Francisco earthquake and the Great Chicago Fire combined.”15  Damage estimates 
ran as high as $2.4 billion—more costly than any storm on record, the inflation-
adjusted equivalent of $12 billion today.
The dollar devastation was large but not large enough to shake a city’s sense of 
itself as a hub of technological progress. In 1966 the recovering city took in $1 million 
a day from the petroleum industry, $50 million a year from business conventions, 
$175 million from tourism in the French Quarter, $190 million in payroll from 27,000 
new NASA rocket assembly jobs. No matter that housing foundations were sinking, or 
the oyster harvest was down, or the marsh below the city was fraying like rotten cloth. 
New Orleans was making a comeback. “Positive thinking has become infectious in the 
new boom city of the Southland,” said U.S. News & World Report.16  
New Orleans was riding too high for talk of the next disas ter. Prosperity was 
fueling itself. 
A Hurricane “Superhighway”
“See that?”  Fisherman Frank “Big Kenny” Campo guns his launch toward the ruin 
of his father’s marina in the shallows east of New Orleans. “Over there, that was Shell 
Beach. Dry land. That light over there was the shore.”17
Dark and barrel-chested, an Isleño whose peasant foreparents emigrated from the 
Canary Islands to colonize Louisiana and fight the British for Spain, Kenny, age 50, 
runs a shanty called Blackie’s Marina from a slip off a freight canal. No fax or Internet 
listing. No shells. No beach. Wakes slap a small lagoon dank with the rot of swamp 
grass. Vines and climbing ivy strangle each other for light.
“It’s been, what, thirty-five years since they built the canal? We’ve sunk thirty 
inches.” 
Kenny kills the outboard and glides. A gray man on a timber dock waves a hose at 
a Styrofoam ice chest. “I’ll tell you what’s wrong with the marsh,” says Blackie Campo.
Father and partner to Kenny and grandfather to a hulk of a youth the family calls 
Little Kenny, Blackie, age 80, remembers green flats of scrub vegetation. Shell roads 
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with lumbering oxen. Palm roofs on tar-paper huts. He remembers Bayou Terre aux 
Bouefs (“land of the oxen”) in the Parish of St. Bernard where Isleños for 200 years 
had guarded their isolation. And Blackie darkly recalls the last week of April in 1927 
when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with presidential approval and 39 tons of 
explosives, blasted the record flood into St. Bernard. It was “the public execution of 
the parish,” said a marsh politi cian, and it haunts the grasslands still.18  “Make a list of 
everything the Corps does around here,” Blackie advises. “Every thing on the list . . . 
THAT’S what’s wrong with the marsh.”19
Once the parish, rich with muskrats, was a fur empire second to none. Blackie 
remembers when Louisiana exported more fur than all of Canada or Russia. When a 
silk-lined coat of Genuine Natural Muskrat was, said Sears and Roebuck in 1927, “a 
remark able value” at $199.20  Living wet and eating from tins, a trap per could net a 
profit, maybe $4,000 a year. He could also net redfish and trout. “We’d trap in the 
winter, fish in the sum mer,” says Kenny with a glance Blackie. “Shell Beach had fifty 
families at one time. We had a train to the French Market [in New Orleans]. The tracks 
went into the water. Right to the [fishing] schooners. How big were those schooners, 
daddy? Fifty feet? We’d fish Lake Borgne, mostly. Fish sold by the string, by ‘the hand’ 
we used to call it. Croaker, flounder, sheepshead, mackerel . . . Best fish in the world. 
We never kept anything under two feet.”
An Isleños trapper, right, discusses the flood threat to muskrats near Delacroix Island, Louisiana, about 1940.   
(U.S. Farm Security Administration)
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 That was before Mister Go. Completed in 1963 at a cost of $95 million, the 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (called MRGO or “Mister Go”) sliced 40 miles from the 
treacherous trip through the delta’s meandering passes. Fog and mud bars had plagued 
navigation through the mouth of the river since 1719 when the French first sounded a 
channel for warships. In 1838 the U.S. Corps of Engineers scraped at the mud with an 
endless-chain bucket dredge. The chain broke. Spare parts went down in a shipwreck. 
After two years of bad luck and mechanical frustra tion, the captain in charge was 
convinced that a ship canal was the surest solution, that “any sum, however large, 
would not be more than commensurate with its [the canal’s] importance.”21  A 
century later the project was “vital,” said Senator Russell B. Long, “to the maintenance 
of the position we hold in the free world today.”22  MRGO, a boon to the Port of 
New Orleans, was Louisiana’s response to grain-trade competition from the new St. 
Lawrence Seaway. It was also a saline cut through the core of Iberian culture in the 
Parish of St. Bernard.
Already that parish below New Orleans was pooling with open water. Barely two 
feet above sea level in 1960, the parish, heavy with mud, had been dropping a tenth 
of an inch each year. Now brine pushed inland by storms ate chunks from the floating 
reed flats. Shell Beach gave way to Lake Borgne.23 
By 1960 five or six houses on stilts had relocated to a paper-thin puzzle of swamp 
grass. Storms sped across shallow water faster than ever before.  “Betsy moved quick,” 
said Blackie. “Too quick,” said those who suspected the engineers were somehow 
involved. It had been 38 years since the Corps had blasted the levee. Had the 
Corps been at it again? “They give us too much credit,” says Harley Winer, a Corps 
hydrologist. “Do they think we were out there with dynamite in 100 mph winds? It’s 
ridiculous.”24
But rumors persist. “Yes sir, they had a plan [to blow the parish levees]. That’s 
what my cousin told me two days before the flood.” When the storm hit two days 
later, Blackie and Kenny were rushing boats to the cover of swamp. “We were towing 
skiffs into the forest,” Blackie explains. “I pulled hard against the current. The [MRGO] 
channel was high [and] the stronger it blew, the higher it got. That’s how the parish 
flooded.” 
Mister Go, said the Times Picayune, had become a “hurricane superhighway.”25  
That’s the conventional wisdom in New Orleans, the gospel truth in St. Bernard. And 
yet it’s absurd. “Let’s just call it a popular misconception,” says Robert J. Guizerix, chief 
of structural engineering at the New Orleans corps. An earnest man in a spotless office, 
he, too, was a witness to Betsy, and this New Orleans native has spent a career making 
sure levees don’t fail again. No 500-foot canal could divert a tidal surge, says Guizerix. 
Nothing as big as Betsy could be captured by anything humanmade. “A hurricane can 
be 200 miles across. A surge can be 100, maybe 150 miles wide. It’s not going to even 
notice a tiny cut. It wouldn’t even know it was there.”26  
Blackie smiles. Rocking back on a porch tacked to a house that was built from the 
wreckage of other houses, a house that the engineers “just picked up and moved” to 
make room for Mister Go, Blackie has already heard too many government experts 
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who dismiss what a fisherman knows. He remembers the Corps telling Congress that 
Mister Go could not have flooded the parish because a 1915 hurricane with the same 
approach had done similar harm. And he remembers the post-Betsy testimony of a Brit 
named Ian Collins. “He was some kind of scientist from England. A red-haired limey!  
This guy’s going to tell me which way the water was flowing? I was there.” When the 
experts denied a link between the channel and hurricane flooding, St. Bernard and six 
other plaintiffs sued for flood compensation. “The inadequacy of the [levee] system 
was fully known, fully appreciated, and the consequences were understood,” said a 
parish spokesman. 27 After a decade of charges and counter-charges, a 5th district judge 
tossed the matter from court.
Defeated by government science, the campaign against Mister Go shifted to a 
war of attrition on murkier legal ground. Congress helped. With President Nixon’s 
signature on January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) became 
the first and most far-reaching legislative attempt to “prevent or eliminate damage to 
the environment and biosphere.” A Magna Carta for environmental protection, NEPA 
made federal builders confront the dark side of engineering—the dislocation, the 
danger to wild species, the risk of planning gone wrong. The law cut to the bone of 
Corps economics. By questioning the way the agency had been allowed to define the 
“benefits” of river improvement, it invited a frank disclosure of what the critics called 
“social cost.”28
NEPA mandated public hearings—a chance for officials in St. Bernard to 
protest and stall construction at every critical stage. In 1972, the target became the 
government’s plan to cargo traffic to a gleaming new mechanized port. Centroport 
U.S.A., as the project came to be called, would be the nation’s biggest ship lock, a 
corps-built Port of New Orleans Mister Go extension that would bypass the congested 
and antiquated urban harbor. Boosters coveted the open space at a small landing called 
Violet in the Parish of St. Bernard. Pete Savoye of the parish sportsman’s league, now a 
retired carpenter from Chalmette, remembers the local talk:  “Hey, we’re going to have 
waterfront property!  We’re going to have warehouses and industry!”29  Supertanker 
and container ships would enrich the parish as they crossed back and forth from river 
to seaway. Rising like an industrial phoenix about 10 miles southeast of Canal Street, 
the rebuilt landing at Violet would be the Rotterdam of the South.30
So said the Corps, the New Orleans dock board, and Louisi ana’s powerful 
Tidewater Development Association. Land develop ers even mailed out a flyer that 
promised an annual payroll of $80 million from 10,000 industrial jobs. Quickly 
negotiations unraveled, however. Who would make important decisions about issues 
affecting the parish? What about marsh degradation? What about the hurricane 
threat? Savoye recalls:  “You’d have to have been an idiot to believe some of the things 
they were saying. You’d have to have been a fool. The politicians said these canals 
would bring us all kinds of goodies. The parish never got a penny. What we got was 
erosion and floods.”31  
Corps ecologist Sue Hawes—a tough-minded mother of three who had studied at 
Brown University and once, in Texas, diffused a cafeteria riot—was prepared for 
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ideological conflict but unprepared for the rancor of Centroport NEPA hearings. On 
November 29, 1972, for example, a seething crowd of about 700 ambushed one of the 
nation’s most powerful politicians. Congressman F. Edward Hebert, a long-time Mister 
Go supporter, said the economy would simply “perish” if the port did not expand. 
Appealing to patriotism, he asked his constituents to “accept and embrace the 
common good.” Appealing to wallets, he promised to “turn the [the Mister Go spur 
canal] project over to St. Bernard Parish for development after its completion. This 
means—hear me well—this means that the New Orleans Dock Board . . . will have 
nothing to do with any control over any of the land.”32   But the parish insurgents had 
heard it all too often. Chanting and jeering and parading through the room with 
placards, the protesters drove Hebert off the auditorium stage. Years later Hebert 
claimed he had never been so rudely treated. Quite a statement. Once the Isleños of St. 
Bernard had defended the bayous with shotguns. Politics had seldom been calm.
Back on River Road in the old army barracks converted to a government 
compound, the Corps responded with outrage. “We’ll go down there and build the 
project with tanks and guns if we have to!” said Col. Richard L. Hunt.33  Politically, 
however, the bullish era of army-directed construction was already dead. Soon the 
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway was halted by court injunction; so was the Cross 
The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) at Saint Bernard Parish, 2006. The Corps,  
citing flooding and environmental concerns, has since closed the outlet to shipping.
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Florida Barge Canal, New Melonis Dam on the Stanislaus, Oakley Dam on the 
Sangamon, and the Baldwin Channel proposal to float supertankers into Califor-
nia’s Central Valley. In Missouri, after a series of NEPA hearings led to embarrassing 
headlines, the Corps stepped back from its plan for high levees north of St. Louis. 
In Texas the voters rejected a plan to make Dallas-Ft. Worth a seaport. In Arkansas a 
federal judge blocked the draining and channelization of Cache River swampland. 
In Idaho the state wildlife agency borrowed the language of NEPA to protest fish kills 
below Dworshak, the Corps’ tallest dam.34 
As engineers grappled with NEPA, Mister Go consumed the marsh. Rapidly 
eroding, the original 650-foot-wide channel had destroyed 3,000 acres of marsh by 
the mid-70s. Hurting fish and shellfish, it leaked pollution and salt. The U.S. Wildlife 
Service feared that a freightway off to Violet would destroy another 5,000 acres and 
“severely impair” the parish’s effort to slow its slide to the Gulf.44  In April 1976, the 
Chief of Engineers in Washington signed off on the Violet project. The governor of 
Georgia weighed in on the side of the parish. If elected to the Presidency, said Jimmy 
Carter, he would cleave the pork alliance between the Corps and the Port of New 
Orleans. No extension to Mister Go would bisect the pasture at Violet. On April 18, 
1977, a press release from the Carter White House killed the Centroport concept, 
calling blandly for “further study.”36 
It had been twenty-one years since Congress had first approved a new ship lock  
for New Orleans. Another twenty would pass before a modern lock was again under 
NEPA review. 
A Concrete Solution
“Russ, you know I’ve a couple of wars on hand,” President Lyndon Baines Johnson 
told the son and political heir of Governor Huey Long.37
Louisiana Senator Russell Bileau Long had been patched through to the White 
House at 1:30 p.m. on Friday, September 10. A teenager when his larger-than-life 
father had died from a gut shot in the Baton Rogue statehouse, he was now, at age 43 
in 1965, the Senate’s majority whip. “Mr. President,” said Long from his Senate office,  
“you know, next to the Great Lakes, Lake Pontchartra in is the biggest lake in America. 
You know how it stands now? Dry. Just like that, water in a wash basin. The forces of 
nature took it and just poured it on New Orleans.” He paused, milking the moment. 
“When neighbors are sick and you visit them, they appreciate it.”
“I’ll certainly send my best man,” the President offered.
“We don’t want your best man, we want the head man,” Long insisted. “Mr. 
President, we want you.”
Six hours later the President was stepping from Air Force One onto the tarmac 
at New Orleans’ Moisant Field. “I am here,” the President said, “because I want to 
see with my own eyes what the unhappy alliance of wind and water have done to 
this land and its people.”38  Wind and water and man, the President might have 
added, because the storm had landed hard where an influx of Texas investors, Lady 
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Bird Johnson among them, planned to levee off 32,000 acres for 250,000 people in 
a new suburb and industrial park. New Orleans East, as it was called, would need 
Corps flood protection; so would the north shore suburbs, Jefferson Parish, the Port 
of New Orleans, the Port of Venice, Morgan City, and a dozen or more other storm-
battered sites. On October 27, 1965, Congress approved $250 million for Louisiana 
projects, including a $56 million down payment on levees and storm barriers for Lake 
Pontchartrain.39
Expecting a Betsy, the Corps had already published a study with a Pontchartrain 
hurricane plan: levees, drains, a ship lock, steel and concrete floodwalls, and two 
gated control structures. The centerpiece would be a fortresslike barrier in the Rigolets 
pass where waves entered the lake. A Dutch innovation adapted by the British after 
a North Sea storm killed 300 near London in 1953, storm barriers with mechanical 
gates could instantly close off a port. The Louisiana version was to be hinged like a 
seawall with sixteen rotating doors. The barrier would stay open for the ebb and flow 
of the gulf in normal weather. It would shut during dangerous storms. Fish biologists 
worried that a dead zone behind the gates might disrupt lake circulation, but in 1974 
the Corps environmental impact state ment (EIS) minimized the threat to marine life. 
Environmental ists scoffed.40  
Corps watchers soon understood more was at stake than marine life. Luke Fontana 
of New Orleans, an attorney who had crabbed and duck-hunted the black lagoons now 
slated for subdivisions, led a crusade linking hurricane engineering to tax-supported 
"land enhancement" schemes. Lady Bird's New Orleans East, for example, would have 
its own triangle of levees. New levees would also reclaim some 5,000 acres for suburbs 
in the crab-rich La Branche wetlands, in the cane and tupelo tidewater of Jefferson 
Parish, and in the north-shore Eden Isle subdivision where devel opers had land-filled 
the bayous only to dredge out recreational canals. Critics feared a "piracy" that would 
"lead to the collapse of the Pontchartrain basin as a viable system."41  It was "pure  
pork-barrel," said Fontana.42  Builders would reap "windfall profits" and, worse, they 
were trashing the public domain.43  
With backing from north shore shrimpers and crabbers and heavyweight Jim 
Tripp, chief counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund in New York, Fontana filed 
for a NEPA injunction in the U.S. 5th District court. What followed was high theatrics: 
fraud accusations, an attack on the drinking habits of an expert witness, documents 
photographed with a hidden camera, a red-faced Fontana swearing and slamming  
the door as he stomped from the judge's chamber, rumors repackaged as news in a 
Times-Picayune exposé. The Corps appeared incompetent when a government  
hydrol ogist disputed another's statistics. The Corps appeared corrupt when the 
plaintiffs produced an early draft of the 1974 EIS. A Corps ecologist had wishfully 
concluded that storm barriers "should not" interfere with the food chain. But the  
chief of the engineering division was not taking any chances: "should not" became a 
definite "will not" in the final report.44  That settled it. On December 30, 1977, Judge 
Charles Schwartz, Jr., denounced the "legally inadequate" science and suspended the 
twelve-year-old barrier plan.45  
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Chastised and sent back to the lake with a team of Louisiana State University 
researchers, the Corps, by 1984, had eliminated hurricane barriers from the project 
design. It no longer mat tered. In seventeen years the estimated expense of the project 
had bloated from $85 million to $924 million. The General Accounting Office doubted 
the barriers could be built even for that. Massive structures of concrete were no longer 
cost-effective. Dirt was less expensive. The Corps compensated with a great wall of 
earthen embankments as tall as seventeen feet.46  
Time plays with the memory of combatants who cling to parts of the puzzle, 
recalling disparate things. Lake defender Luke Fontana remembers the Corps' attempt 
to cloud the case in a blizzard of information. Ecologist Sue Hawes remembers "bad 
science."47  Joseph Towers, a Corps attor ney, remembers "an embarrassing situation."48   
Engineer Robert Guizerix remembers mostly the sound of wind sucking water as Betsy 
“lifted Pontchartrain [over New Orleans] and dropped the lake like a bomb.” There are 
few historical files in the engineer’s office. He can't even recall the disputes over levees 
for land enhancement. "Their scientists said one thing. Ours said an other."49  That's 
what Guizerix remembers. All he can say for sure is that barriers guarding the lake are 
the better engineering solution. Tall levees are more expensive. More expensive and 
not as safe.
"The next Betsy—that's all it will take," says Guizerix. "When the next big 
hurricane comes, and it will, people will be wanting the barriers.” Meanwhile, he won't 
be tossing out any plans. 
Unnatural Disasters
Memory fades in the wreckage of recent disasters. Four years after Betsy did or did 
not ride Mister Go, 200 mph Camille, the strongest hurricane on record, sent a 24-foot 
wave through a Mississippi apartment house where 25 party-goers decided to wait out 
the storm. The building imploded on impact. One person and the concrete foundation 
survived.50  
"Today humans are playing too large a role in natural disasters to call them 
natural," said a 1984 report from the Swedish Red Cross. "People are changing their 
environment to make it more prone to some disasters, and are behaving so as to make 
themselves more vulnerable to those hazards."51  As the earth experiences its most 
dramatic climatic shift since the time of Julius Caesar, the forecast is more of the same: 
global warming and rising oceans will make major storms more frequent, their impact 
more intense.52
The toe of Louisiana will vanish according to that dismal forecast, and the battle 
to hold the alluvial delta now consumes more tax and engineering resources than 
it originally took to reclaim it. Therein lies the tragedy of safety innovations that 
promote unsafe behavior, of unknowable hazards and unintended effects. In the wake 
of Betsy we see that levees block water and silt needed to replenish lowlands, that 
dredging loosens the land by killing freshwater plants. We understand that the cost of 
maintaining a Mister Go ($12 million a year; another $3 million or more per mile for 
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marsh restoration) can be much greater than sa vings from faster shipping. We know 
that a moving shore is not much of a problem until Man tries to stop it, that concrete 
solutions to coastal erosion can steepen a beach by deflecting its sand supply. We 
realize, or we should, that there is no turning back from all that we’ve made of the 
marsh without risking economic disaster. Paradoxically, tragically, we also know that 
to build as before would be to risk a catastrophe worse.53   
"It's ironic," says Robert Brown of New Orleans, formerly a Corps publicist, now 
a homeowner with a cracking driveway. "The system which brings prosperity and 
security to humans is liter ally costing them the earth beneath their feet."54  Too young 
to remember Hurricane Betsy, he's learned its lesson nevertheless.
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CHAPTER TWO
Lessons of the Levees
Philip Brown sits on a box near the edge of a cornfield where his grandfather 
packed dirt on the levee and the torrent of '27 tore out the family farm. "The end will 
come with a flood," says Brown, quoting from Nostradamus. "I hope that Nostradamus 
fellow don't know what he's talking about. I've got six boats under the house just in 
case."1 
Brown grows cotton, rice, soybeans, and corn in black soil between Lake 
Providence and the Mississippi, a lush 10,000 acres in the northeast corner of 
Louisiana just below the Arkansas line. A levee crusader, a true believer in the progress 
of a Protestant people predestined to reclaim the land, Brown can't figure why the 
Corps, as he sees it, has "caved in and bent over backwards" when the risk of a flood 
disaster seems greater than ever before. We drive to a "slide" in the levee where 
the embankment is badly eroded. A backhoe sits idle next to a tractor and other 
equipment. It's 2 p.m. on a Friday and there's not a worker in sight. 
"They say it's the budget. They always say it's the budget." 
Brown knows different. Engineer friends have whispered frustration about the 
threat of a wildlife lawsuit over construction in the forested floodplain. To repair 
and upgrade the levees, builders need a mountain of earth. Farmers want it scooped 
from the forest. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, based in San Francisco and New 
Orleans, wants to spare the bottomland forest and trench the dirt from the fields. 
Lawyers negotiate. Biologists hold out for studies of migrating bears and fruit bats 
while the deliberate Mississippi—rising to 49 feet, now just nine feet below the 1927 
flood of record—spreads west and pools over the woodland. A ghost thicket of willows 
stands on its grey reflection. Hardly a forest. A lumber company has anticipated the 
levee construction and felled the most valuable trees.
A skiff cuts a wake through the woodland. Silent water. Cotton sky. It's May in 
Louisiana, the river's most menacing month. Dangerous because it drains some of 
the flattest land in the nation, the Mississippi can blow through an earthen levee at 
three million cubic feet per second, about 20 times its normal low-water flow. Brown 
prepares for the worst. He writes the governor. He flushes out the armadillos that 
burrow deep into levees. He shoots unspeakable thoughts at his river neighbor, willing 
him back. 
"Levees don't hurt the forest," says Brown, blood rising. "Those Sierra Club 
environmental people don't know what they're talking about. They're doctors and 
lawyers from Jackson or someplace. Those environmental people got the Corps giving 




Bent bureaucracy also concerns a man who looks down on the Corps from the 
relative safety of Lafayette, Louisiana, where the mud fan of the Mississippi meets a 
ridge guarded by oaks.
Harold Schoeffler, cofounder of the Sierra Club's Delta chapter, is robust and 
powerfully built. A scout leader who divides his time between selling Cadillacs and 
preaching the value of wetlands, he agrees that engineering in the era of Clinton has 
caved to a powerful force. "Hell yes," Schoeffler insists. "[The Corps] has caved into 
navigation, the [sugar]cane growers, the port authorities, the dredging industry."3  Half-
Cajun, half-German, a devout Catholic, a former air force supply sergeant with an 
engineering degree, Schoeffler claims to know more than enough about what builders 
have done to the floodplain. Enough to bedevil the Corps. Enough to respect the 
power of the twisting river and scoff at human constraints. 
"The Sierra Club wants to work WITH nature," says Schoef fler, putting it simply. 
"Engineers want to knock it down."
The tragedy of Man's lost communion with Nature plays well in the Cajun 
country. Schoeffler's adaptation begins with the Yankee invaders who logged the 
magnificent cypress. "The greed of those bastards. . . . They put themselves out of 
business.” Logging corporations cleared about 14 million acres of lower Mississippi 
hardwoods, Schoeffler continues. Little effort was made to replant or even spare a few 
virgin trees. And when the era of lumber gave way to sugar cane, rice, and oil and gas 
A tenant farmstead under the mainstem levees, Lake Providence, Louisiana, 1940.  
(Farm Security Administration, Library of Congress) 
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exploration, the swamp builders gouged canals to barge in heavy equipment. Even 
shallow dredging did considerable damage. Schoeffler explains: "Dredging changed 
natural hydraulics, accelerated siltation, and created oxygen-deprived dead zones 
where no aquatic life is possible. The worst thing is that no one is calculating the 
cumulative impact of what we're doing: a rice field here, an oil canal there, a crawfish 
pond in the swamp, a road blocking the flow on a thousand acres."4 
June in Lafayette Parish. Nostalgia hangs in the humid air where the bayou people 
spin stories about swamplands desecrated, about fishermen dispossessed. Schoeffler 
mourns for the lost republic. Calling engineers "carpetbaggers," he denounces levee-
building as a modern enclosure movement to privatize flood-swept land. Today that 
preoccupation is peaked by a telephone message from Memphis. Sierra Clubbers have 
sighted the rare history professor with laptop, a threatened species in parts of the 
South. A call from Lafayette invites me into the bayou, and soon we are scouting by 
silver canoe in an emerald jungle of songbirds, Louisiana's Atchafalaya.
Wild abundance amid vaulting construction makes this gem of a tourist attraction 
the nation's most ironic swamp. For centuries the Atchafalaya (pronounced Uh-
chafuh-lie'-yuh, a Choctaw word meaning "long river") had been a sluggish distribu-
tary of the Mississippi, log-jammed and snake-infested. That was before Henry Miller 
Shreve. Pilot, gambler, inventor, gun-runner for Andy Jackson, the intuitive Shreve 
adapted the stern-wheel steamboat to shallow-draft navigation by elevating the boiler 
and flattening the hull. He also taught Louisiana to cut through oxbow channels. In 
1831, at Turnbull Bend about fifty miles above Baton Rouge where the sharp corner 
of Mississippi elbowed Louisiana, Shreve severed a thin neck of land. Engineers then 
cleared stumps and vines from Louisiana's linguine of channels, and with every 
navigation improvement the current ran faster and deeper until the Atchafalaya’s 
moss-bearded cyprus floodway was the third or forth largest river in the United 
States. In 1952 Louisiana Geologist Harold N. Fisk confirmed what the Corps had 
long suspected: Old Man was straining to jump. The Atchafalaya would "capture" the 
Mississippi. Texaco, Shell, Mobile, Union Carbide, B.F. Goodrich, du Pont, Uniroyal, 
Dow, Georgia-Pacific and other industrial giants would be cut from their toxic 
freightway. Flood Armageddon would sweep to the Gulf through the floodwalls at 
Morgan City. Big Muddy at New Orleans would be rivulets braided with marsh.
5"Deltas move," Schoeffler shrugs. Sensitive to the plight of sinking cities and 
some 110 petrochemical plants on the river below Baton Rouge, the swamper believes, 
nevertheless, that the Big Jump of the Mississippi is only a matter of time. 
Engineers disagree. Any tourist can take Louisiana Hwy. 1 north from Baton 
Rouge to the Old River Control complex that holds the Mississippi, keeping the 
world's busiest water-freight highway in place. Authorized in 1954, opened in 1962, 
and rebuilt after a barge nearly knocked out the structure in 1973, Old River Control 
is a five-project, 300-million gallons-per-second enforcer of the status quo. Dividing 
the Father of Waters where his current strains to the West, the lock and weir complex 
ensures an equitable split between swamp river and errant parent: 70 percent of the 
flow held in the Mississippi, 30 percent allowed to escape into the Atchafalaya. 
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Engineers take justifiable pride in that elegant arrangement, but the river colossus 
above Baton Rouge, like most construction in water, has unplanned consequences. 
More sediment than expected fills the basin like sand in a bathtub, reducing the 
floodway's flood capacity, clogging drainage. Levees close and reconfigure the trackless 
pathways that bayou people once used to harvest their bounty of crawfish. "It's not 
going to do much good to save the basin if we don't have access to it," Schoeffler 
complains.6   He says the feds have reneged on their promise to set aside 50,000 wild 
acres. Although Uncle Sam has purchased the emergency right to flood the taxpayers' 
floodway, the basin's most powerful players—loggers, miners, soybean farmers, cattle 
ranchers—want evermore flood protection. Engineers continue to levee and dredge. 
What remains of the marshy swath through the heart of the Cajun country is 
a 135-mile-long semi-tropical semi-wilderness, a treasure by any measure. Larger 
than Florida's Everglades, the Atchafalaya has been called the last great river swamp 
in North America: a rest stop and winter resort for more than 300 bird species, for 
dowitchers, spoonbills, tanagers, grosbeaks, thrushes, and mallards; a fairyland of ferns 
and tree orchids, of slow water soft with hyacinth lilies and noisy with amphibious 
life. Schoeffler takes Boy Scouts into the swamp once or twice every year, but today he 
is shocked to discover his favorite haunt has been clear-cut. The bald cypress is gone. 
So are the tupelo, pecan, hackberry, water-oak, and water-privet. Our camp is bare as 
a fairway. Behind a black line of ragged willows screening the camp from the river, all 
that remains are the shrubs. 
A sign reads, "Attention Campers: Woodcutting Prohibited." 
Cypress rise from the green shallows of Bayou Pigeon in Louisiana’s Atchafalaya basin.   (JAG355/Flickr)
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Finding wood in any event, Schoeffler torches a fistful of reeds with a disposable 
lighter. We boil crawfish while slapping mosquitoes. We sleep on a wet canvas. In the 
morning we paddle to a landing upriver, feast on chicken and rice, exchange the canoe 
for a Yamaha jet ski, and bounce through open water in oil-rich Vermilion Bay. 
Waves roll gently across this sunken floor of a wandering delta. Abandoned by the 
Mississippi some 5,000 years before the colonial powers of Europe traded for Louisiana, 
the bayou-fed lime-bottom bay rises a foot each generation—about four times faster 
than the rise of the North Atlantic. Shrimp, bass, and sea trout mature in the brackish 
fringe of the bay-swept oystergrass wetlands. Herons visit from Venezuela. Blue geese 
commute from as far away as the Yukon and Hudson Bay. Schoeffler comes to duck 
hunt and fish; also to inspect a black mound of shell and clay near a Corps-approved 
tanker canal. Deposits scooped from the bay—once called "spoil," now called "dredged 
material" in tribute to the many uses of muck in marsh and island construction—make 
a dense and gluey foundation for hurricane buffer projects. In theory these projects 
deflect "wave energy" pounding the shoreline. Schoeffler has another theory. He says 
the dredging has opened a trench that corrodes the edge of the marsh with a beige 
foam of reed-killing brine. "It’s a moral issue," Schoef fler shouts, craning his neck to 
be heard over the roar of the jet ski. "An oyster can't make it to court. A shrimp can't 
make it to court. We have to do what we can."
Rain suspends the tour. We wait out the storm on a trawler with a shrimper named 
Steve Oleander. A tall young Cajun in rain boots, he spits overboard as we talk. 
"What do you think of the Corps?" asks Schoeffler, turning to his preoccupation. 
Oleander says he seldom has time for the paper. 
Schoeffler persists: "Look what they do. The Corps plays chess a move at a time, 
but nature is ten moves ahead.” 
Yes, the shrimper concedes, the take from the bay has been thin since the dredge 
began working the channel. "I ain't had ten damn boxes [of shrimp] all damn season.” 
He leans forward to spit in the water. "I tell you what, you can't stop a coast from 
moving. Mother Nature, she can move a ten-thousand pound rock."7
NEPA and the Giant 
A stump forest. An impaired wetland. A delta deprived of land-building mud. 
Big Muddy continues to vex the nation's largest and most controversial engineering 
organization, an enigma with a public persona much like the Mississippi, menacing 
and majestic, reviled and revered. 
Two hundred years of dispute has conditioned the Corps to combat. Born in 
Thomas Jefferson's ploy to purge the friends of Alexander Hamilton from high rank in 
the United States Army, the engineers and their academy at West Point matured with 
a Congress deeply divided over the legality of water construction. State legislators of 
the 1830s vilified the scientific elite of the army, calling it a "military aristocracy.” Mark 
Twain compared the West Pointers to God. Ever since, the Corps has been lauded and 
lambasted in epic words that mostly obscure its middle position between federalism 
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and localism, between the Hamiltonian faith in a government run by the experts and 
the Jeffersonian passion for community power.8  
How people perceive the Corps' place in the nation is a good indication of how 
they regard modernization and the government's role in their lives. Farmer Brown 
of Lake Providence tells a historical story about his grandfather, an engineer, who 
surveyed for the Mississippi River Commission back in the days when local districts 
built and maintained the levees with little help from the feds. Then came the Flood of 
1927. Exploding through an Arkansas levee at crevasses below Pine Bluff, the discharge 
of 30 Niagaras (about 450,000 cfs.) washed out a farming community of about 500 
people, carrying off cattle and cotton and the Brown family's country store. In all, 
the swollen river displaced more than 600,000 people in 162,017 homes. Claiming 
between 250 and 500 victims on 16.5 million acres, the disaster brought the Corps and 
Congress into flood protection on a massive scale. The Flood Control Act of 1928 made 
the battle against high water the responsibility of the nation. Sparing the levee farmers 
the cost of flood construction and shifting that burden to Uncle Sam, the legislation 
began the $9.3 billion Mississippi River and Tributaries (MR&T) Project: dikes, dams, 
pumping stations, floodwalls, floodways, concrete mats in the river, cut-offs through 
bends in the channel, and a Great Wall of earthen embankments, more than five times 
the tonnage of dirt moved for the Panama Canal.9  
"The government built Cadillac levees," says Brown, his mind drifting back to a 
time when nearly every Louisianan could see that the river—a menace, a monster—
was defiant and ever-ready to break human control.
When Brown was a young man during the early Eisenhower administration, the 
Corps made a promotional film that captured the zeal of the times. Shackles for the 
Giant, released in 1953, told a heroic tale of builders at war with nature, of channel 
cutoffs that saved Greenville and Arkansas City, of dredges, draglines, and 'dozers 
that moved 20 tons in a load. The new river of gravel and concrete was "straighter" 
and "more effi cient.” No line in the script mentioned the limits of river construction. 
No footage hinted that engineering might be imperfect or that the giant might not 
comply. 
As the MR&T found a place next to Bonneville Dam and the Manhattan Project 
in the pantheon of Corps achievement, the lesson of the levees was clear: "it is 
the lesson," said a 1967 tribute to army construction, "that man, as a spiritual and 
intellectual entity in the Creator's image, may order his own destiny."10   Army 
engineers, the publication continued, were America's "fighting elite.” Yet there was 
arrogance in the story of man's domination of nature, and thus a villainous Corps 
emerged from the pen of agency critics. "The Corps of Army Engineers is the most 
powerful and most persuasive lobby in Washington," wrote New Dealer Harold Ickes 
after Congress refused to behead the quasi-military organization by removing its 
West Point command.11  Corps-foe Arthur Morgan of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
compared his nemesis to a "Mafia" built on "explicit falsehoods, . . . a regime of favored 
dominance rarely paralleled in our government."12  
Even during the heyday of river building, the Corps was effectively tarred with 
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allegations of waste and abuse. Presidents Harding, Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, 
and Eisenhower all tried to humble the Corps through bureaucratic reorganization. 
All failed. When FDR rejected the Corps' claim to the Kings Canyon dam site in 
the California Sierras, Congress, in 1944, simply appropriated the funds. Soon the 
1948 Hoover Commission was calling the Corps a rogue that manipulated the 
budget process. A 1952 House report provided a vivid example: 157 of 182 Corps 
projects had been approved without the proper cost-benefit documentation. Some 
had been underestimated 400 percent. Critics now damned the Corps as a public 
enemy, a diligent destroyer, a beaver whose instinct told it to dam every trickle of 
water, a dogcatcher compelled to impound anything running wild. "Getting a man 
off heroin is easy compared with getting Congress off the kind of pork barrel the 
Corps administers," said Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.13  Extravagant, 
destructive, power-mad, and undemocratic, the Corps, wrote journalist Gene Marine, 
was "the most nearly untouchable empire in the United States, as powerful in its field 
as the FBI or the CIA and as difficult to oppose."14
The myth of the imperial Corps survives on the Mississippi because it stands 
on a partial truth. There is truth in the boast that the Corps has elevated flood 
engineering with high standards of professionalism. There is also truth in the 
allegation that the Corps has enjoyed an uncommonly cordial relationship with 
Congressional patrons, that it has oversold dubious projects, and that its benefit-cost 
ratios have exaggerated benefits and minimized costs. Still, the agency's past remains 
imaginative simplification. Beast, benefactor, sinner, saint: the caricatures make the 
Corps monolithic and omnipresent. They obscure conflict within a decentralized 
organization. And they depreciate the cultural context—the politics and economics, 
the hope and fear and folklore and scientific conjecture—that shapes water planning 
and shades engineering design.
Technology has always responded to culture; it backflipped after President Richard 
Nixon—in a press conference dramatically scripted for January 1, 1970, the first day of 
the new decade—empowered Congress to regulate most kinds of public construction 
through the far-reaching National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). It was hardly the 
first legislative attempt to safeguard water resources. The Refuse Act of 1899, the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1924, the Beach Nourishment Act of 1956, the Federal Water Project 
Recreation Act of 1965, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 had all pledged 
to conserve and preserve by expanding Corps jurisdiction, but NEPA transformed 
the way government built. A challenge to engineering tradition, the legislation 
required builders to ponder the system-wide impact of local construction. NEPA, 
moreover, brought ecologists into the Corps and complicated project planning with 
archaeological studies, water quality assessments, habitat inventories, citizen advisors, 
public hearings, and judicial review. 
For Lieutenant General Frederick J. Clarke, Chief of Engineers, the key to NEPA 
compliance was to invite environmentalists into the planning process. Reorganization 
followed: a blue-ribbon advisory board, a vastly expanded wetlands permit operation, 
an ecology office in each of the Corps' 11 regional divisions and 36 local districts. By 
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1976 only the U.S. Transportation Department was publishing more environmental 
impact statements. Nationwide, the Corps churned out more than 300 environmental 
assessments at a cost of about $25 million a year.15
But did the Corps take NEPA to heart? How warm was its embrace of 
environmental regulation, and how was NEPA regarded by technicians at water 
level who watched the river gauges and waited for the inevitable flood? "The Corps 
responded differently in different places," Hugh "Tom" Holland explains. A Corps 
zoologist now retired in Tucson, Holland spent four years in Florida with the 
Jacksonville district before joining the Mississippi Valley Division in 1972. Jacksonville 
saw NEPA coming. Battlewise after a series of high-stakes lawsuits—a bitter fight over 
Everglades channelization, an injunction against the Cross Florida Barge Canal—the 
district in Holland's time had outflanked the green opposition by blocking a trailer 
park on landfill in Boca Ciega Bay. But the Lower Mississippi drained another political 
landscape. "The division was more hard-nosed," Holland remembers. At headquarter 
building in Vicksburg, an arched and turreted landmark that, appropriately, resembles 
a reddish castle, Holland recalls confusion: the backlog of reservoir studies, the 
sampling of mud and netting of fish with inadequate scientific equipment, the rush 
to measure the impact of projects more than thirty years old. "NEPA set us back," says 
Holland. "It meant more regulations, more hearings, and more lawsuits. It increased 
our paperwork 900 percent."16
Upriver a deputy district engineer has been with the Corps long enough to 
confirm Holland's assessment. David W. Wolfe commands a fifth floor view of Mud 
Island from the Memphis federal building. Laconic and dour with a gravel voice as 
coarse as revetment, Wolfe shrugs off the idea that NEPA forced change. "We're always 
changing," says Wolfe. The defining moment of environmental transformation—if 
there ever was such a time—was long before the era of Earth Day. He cites a New Deal 
fisheries law that was amended to regulate dredging about the time Wolfe joined the 
Corps as student intern during the Eisenhower years. Change is good, he concedes, but 
Wolfe objects to the way people scapegoat his organization for doing what Congress 
intended. The solution? "If you've got project authorization, build quickly. Don't wait 
for people to change their minds."17
That's a view from inside the castle. From outside, the era of NEPA looked pivotal 
indeed. While the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 
and others were mostly trying to stonewall environmental directives, the Corps, said 
political scientist Richard A. Liroff, truly welcomed reform. The conclusion was much 
the same in studies of NEPA compliance. In Staking the Terrain (1985), where professors 
Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel McCool graded the Corps on a curve against six 
other natural resource agencies, the builder earned top marks for shedding some of 
its past. After NEPA the Corps had become a "bureaucratic superstar, . . . the epitome 
of a successful, aggressive, developing organization."18  Likewise a 1979 Brookings 
Institution report called the agency a "possible exception" to the law of bureaucratic 
behavior that change must proceed at a glacier-like pace.19
Not everyone applauded. "If a project becomes too controversial, its backers can 
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simply out wait the opponents," wrote Elizabeth Drew in Atlantic Monthly.20  Critics 
cited the Gulf Intercostal Canal, the Yazoo flood gates and pumping stations, the lock 
building above St. Louis, and the hotly disputed Tenn-Tom waterway—all crippled by 
NEPA, all revived nevertheless. It wasn't only the pork that unsettled the opposition. 
It was the axiom that, construction being profit and progress, enough tonnage of 
concrete was an answer to every concern. 
"The engineer has become our king," said wetlands defender George Laycock, a 
critic of the way builders allegedly think: "Where a river silts up—dredge it. When it 
runs crooked—straighten it. Where it runs straight—deepen it. Where it runs at all—
stop it. And where it doesn't run—build a canal."21
Every Puddle and Pond
NEPA was a political earthquake. Panic struck Congress the following year when 
staffers read Water Wasteland, Ralph Nader's call to arms. Chesapeake Bay was dying. 
Bacteria in the Hudson River was 170 times the swimmable limit. Nine out of ten FDA-
tested swordfish had mercury levels unsafe for human consumption. A third of the 
nation's shell fishing bed had been closed due to pollution. The annual commercial 
shrimp harvest, 6.3 million pounds in 1936, had nosedived to 10,000 pounds.22  
Wetlands were another concern. America's bogs, marshes, mudflats, and flood-
swept woodlands—literally the "wet" lands that filtered pollution and sheltered 
wildlife—were vanishing at a frightening rate. Twenty-two states had lost more than 
half of their original wetlands. Ten had lost more than 70 percent. In the Lower 
Mississippi Valley, where the plow had already displaced about 80 percent of the 
bottomland hardwoods and the fight to protect what remained was especially fierce, 
the six river-states below Illinois had lost, since Jefferson's time, a Kentucky-size wedge 
of the swampy heartland, about 28 million acres.23  Ecologists blamed canal dredging 
and oil drilling for saltwater eating away at another 3 million acres of Louisiana's 
coastal wetlands. Although the Corps, in 1967, had been handed the authority to 
prevent some harmful kinds of wetlands dredging, that mandate was rarely enforced.24
With the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act—the Clean Water Act, as 
it came to be called—Congress responded in the same grandiose way it had mostly 
dealt with any waterborne crisis: it gave the Corps a vast and ill-defined regulatory 
jurisdiction, a quagmire as it turned out. The act, said Tennessee Republican Howard 
Baker, was "far and away the most significant and promising piece of environmental 
legislation ever enacted by Congress."25  And it was, except that the legislation 
bestowed a power most engineers didn't want. Under section 404 of the statute, the 
Corps was required to issue or deny a permit for any dumping of "dredged or fill 
material" into "waters of the United States."26  Dredging, long regulated, was easy 
to define, but fill? How about the dirt moved for a house foundation? How about 
a road through a bog? Army regulations attempted to limit the program to the 
corridors of transportation that Congress, in 1899, had called "navigable waters.” 
Environmentalists sued to expand that definition and won. In Natural Resources Defense 
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Council, Inc., v. Callaway (1975), Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., ruled that the 404 
permit power should be broadly applied. Congress, Robinson wrote, had extended 
Corps jurisdiction to "all coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps, and similar areas that are 
contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters."27  Even the water frozen in tundra. 
Even ponds.
NRDC v. Callaway—a political earthquake, a Corps public relations disaster—
made a sheriff out of a builder, turning the in-between organization against its own 
engineering tradition and breaching the laissez-faire of private property rights. A press 
release of May 6, 1975, caught the agency's moment of panic. "Millions of people may 
be presently violating the law," wrote Locke Morton, the Corps' deputy chief of public 
affairs. "The rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond . . . the farmer who wants to 
deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field . . . the mountaineer who wants to protect 
his land against stream erosion" might all, said the Corps, be required to file permits 
and "criminal offenders" might face a year in prison and up to $25,000 in fines.28  
Boldly worded, the Corps' statement was misleading and ill-advised. EPA director 
Russell E. Train said the reference to plowing farmers was "seriously inaccurate."29  Ron 
Outen of the National Resources Defense Council accused the Corps of a "coordinated 
nationwide campaign to create a political backlash" against the Calloway decision. It 
was a "blitzkrieg of mistruth, innuendo, and exaggeration" said a National Wildlife 
Federation attorney who threatened to drag the Corps "kicking and screaming" back 
into federal court.30  Even Army Secretary Howard Callaway, the man immortalized as 
the vanquished defendant in the famous wetlands lawsuit, conceded that the Corps' 
response to the issue was "not too smart."31  
Still there were those who said the court had overstepped the intent of Congress, 
that the new regulations were bound to have a chilling effect on the activity regulated, 
and that the Corps could hardly be blamed for bluntly stating the facts. Congressman 
John B. Breaux, a Louisiana Democrat, slammed the permit program, calling it "a land 
use power grab that couldn't be accomplished through legislation."32  Corps authority 
under mined local self-governance, Breaux insisted. Engineers were now arbiters of land 
schemes and zoning disputes across 85 percent of the state. 
"Congress puts an engineer out there to make controversial decisions," says Col. L. 
Kent Brown of the New Orleans district, a former commander. "The Clean Water Act 
was supposed to be about water quality, but we use it to tell people they can't develop 
their property. Politicians like it that way. They want to campaign against big bad 
government. They expect the Corps to protect the wetlands but Congress won't pass 
the laws.” Brown, who grew up on farms, compares the complexity of the wetlands 
issue to kicking over a cow turd. "There's more than one bug in it."33
As engineers kicked at the bugs of environmental regulation, an odd 
transformation took place. The Corps, no longer the bane of the green revolution, 
became its last best hope. "Our job," said General Clarke, "was to do what we always 
had done: do what the people of the country wanted."34  But which people? People 
who cared about duckweed or those who wanted the Corps to care more about saving 
their homes?  Engineering—good engineer ing, at least—required clarity of focus and 
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purpose, a precise understanding of the problem at hand. Seldom, however, had the 
Corps' constituency mostly agreed on an agenda for water resources. Seldom had 
clients and patrons spoken with a common voice. 
By 1975 the changes transforming the Corps were remaking the lower delta where 
water was thickly layered with overlapping jurisdictions. Old friends were beginning to 
quarrel. "Please recognize that we love you," said Louisiana's Governor Edwin Edwards, 
addressing the Corps at a wetlands hearing. "We think you're a great agency, but we 
don't need you.” Edwards vowed to resist Uncle Sam's interference. "No great damage 
is going to come to the country if we handle these [water] problems on a local basis—
as we intend to do."35
That was a first. Surely the first time since Union troops withdrew during the Era of 
Reconstruction that Louisiana had told the Corps it could manage just fine on its own. 
Yazoo Blues
“This is bigger than Mississippi,” said Mike Moore, the state attorney general and 
target of political wrath.  It was January 14, 1990, and the governor in Jackson had 
recently vetoed a bill that would have prohibited Moore from suing the Corps. At issue 
was the spidery Yazoo. Flatter than Kansas, larger than Connecticut, the Yazoo was a 
Fertile Crescent of cotton and soybeans. Moore and his environmentalist allies said the 
Corps-built levees that drained these croplands were a threat to ecological health.  
“This involves the globe, the planet,” warned Moore, explaining his maverick 
stance to a Chicago Tribune reporter. “I’m concerned about where we’re going to be 
20 years from now. This is for the family. To heck with politics. I’m concerned about 
water, oxygen. I’m ready to fight the fight.”36
Pitting farmer against duck hunter, old-guard flatlander against hill-dwellers and 
the environmentally-minded in gleaming new office towers, the fight suspended a 
project on the books since the 1930s. A sprawling network of levees, reservoirs, and 
enlarged channels, the Yazoo project was, said the Corps, “the most advanced flood-
control system in the world today, and probably the most complex.”37  Also perhaps 
one of the most expensive. Congress, by 1990, had spent an estimated $1.3 billion to 
drain and untangle the Delta. To connect bayous, expedite drainage, and add 112,000 
acres of floodplain to the acreage already cleared, the Corps needed another $150 to 
$200 million over the next 25 years.  
“This whole thing is absolute madness,” said Jim Carroll, an environmental 
attorney on a commission that hounded the Corps. “This is the last of the great pork 
barrel projects. It makes the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway look like a drop in the 
bucket.”38   The solution? “It’s time to deauthorize the Yazoo debacle,” wrote Lonnie 
Williamson in a column for Outdoor Life.”39  
Nobody disputed the need for some kind of levee protection. The Yazoo, allegedly 
an Indian word for “river of death,” rose in the hill country of Tennessee-Mississippi 
and spread through nine major branches and countless bayous southward toward its 
mouth at the harbor of Vicksburg. Technically a tributary, the Yazoo was the fabled 
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“delta” of the Mississippi—an alluvial flatland with an average slope north to south  
of only six inches per mile. Once this cotton kingdom was switch cane shaded by 
forest. “In the state of nature,” a naturalist reported in 1849, “this country was almost 
wholly covered with trees, many of which are of great magnitude.”40  Backwoodsmen 
felled the post oak (Quercus obtusiloba) for fences and cabins. Boat builders carved 
square pegs from the honey locust (Gleditsia triacanthos). Wild cherry (Prunas Virgiana) 
and black walnut (Juglans nigra) made quality cabinets and chairs. Geese, panthers, 
wolves, bears, deer, and pigs imported from Europe thrived in the Yazoo woodlands. 
The first Euro-Americans, however, did not. Cursed by mosquitoes and floods, white 
settlement was sparse before the State of Mississippi provided for the policing of 
private levees. In 1838 the state legislature authorized the Board of Police to divide  
the Yazoo basin into five or more levee districts.  Inspectors had the power to fine 
planters who neglected their levees. Slaves could be commandeered for construction 
so long as they labored close to home. Serious flooding in 1849 and 1858 seeded 
local support for a safer, more centralized system. In 1859, a basin-wide levee district 
elected a president, hired an engineer, and raised nearly $500,000 with a tax of ten 
cents an acre. Some 12,000 yeomen and 53,000 slaves had drained more than  
500,000 acres by the eve of the Civil War.
Boys paddle a makeshift raft over the riparian “batture lands” of the flooding Mississippi, about 1900.  
(Alexander Allison/University of New Orleans)  
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During the 1870s, when the Corps first studied the Yazoo, 250 miles of steamboat 
freightway branched toward cotton plantations with an annual yield of 120,000 to 
150,000 bales. Major J.H. Willard marveled at the basin’s progress. “Conditions have 
changed immensely,” Willard reported from Vicksburg. “By the cooperation of the 
[Mississippi] river commission, state levee commissions, and the Yazoo and Mississippi 
Valley Railway Company, a basin some 200 miles long by about 60 miles broad . . . has 
been secured from overflow.”41  But the flooding continued.
Disastrous floods in 1897, 1903, and 1913 melted inadequate levees and left 
thousands homeless. Upgraded after 1917 with federal monies channeled through 
the Mississippi River Commission, the Yazoo flood works held against the torrent of 
’27. At Mounds Landing above Greenville, however, the raging Arkansas joined the 
Mississippi where a barrage of uprooted trees battered the trembling earth. Fifteen 
hundred workers sandbagged through the night of April 20, 1927, in a vain attempt 
to plug a yawning crevasse. The levee, a worker remembered, “felt like jelly.” Another 
recalled that the land “just started boiling. Someone hollered `Watch out! It’s gonna 
break!’  Everyone was hollering to get off. It was like turning a hydrant on—water was 
shooting forward.”42   The western bowl of the Yazoo became a 50 by 100-mile lake 20 
feet deep in places. High water washed over rooftops 75 miles away. 43     
Sharecroppers crowd into canvas-tent refugee camps on the levees of the Yazoo River during the 1927 flood.  
(Mississippi Department of Archives).
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Flooding out an estimated 185,000 people in the Yazoo delta, the Mounds  
Landing crevasse was the worst levee disaster in American history. Another 100,000 
deltonians lost homes five years later when the Yazoo flooded near Greenwood. Not 
until 1936, however, did Congress fully concede that swamp water floods were “a 
menace to national welfare.” Flood control with that recognition became “a proper 
activity of the Federal Government in cooperation with the States.” 
Colossal and unprecedented, the Flood Control Act of 1936 pledged an astounding 
$320 million for 218 projects and 223 surveys. It remained for Mississippi 
Congressman Will M. Whittington of rainy Leflore County to make sure his 
neighbors along the Yazoo received an adequate share. As the powerful chair of the 
House Flood Control Committee and a legend in cotton country, Whittington, in 
1937, maneuvered to exempt his constituents from their hated “abc” requirements. No 
longer would local taxes be needed to (a) relocate public roads, (b) purchase land and 
easements, or (c) maintain a levees system built almost entirely with federal funds. 
Whittington, before he retired to Greenwood in 1950, had framed the basic elements 
of the modern Yazoo plan. Its centerpiece was four Corps-managed reservoirs: Sardis, 
Arkabutla, Grenada, and Enid, a combined storage capacity of 3.8 million-acre feet. 
Congress over the years added more than 500 miles of headwater levees for a total 
cost of $429 million (in 1995 dollars). In 1941, Congress authorized a breastwork of 
backwater levees—a project for the lower delta that would keep the Mississippi from 
pooling over the Yazoo’s forested sump.44
Whether the system was pork or elegant plumbing depended on one’s perspective. 
Flood protection was a matter of public safety, but most the Yazoo’s croplands (1.2 
million acres, according to Corps statistics) had been floodplain forest prior to 
Whittington’s plan. In 1960 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had stated the obvious: 
the project was “a single-purpose program for increasing agricultural production.”45   
Two years later the U.S. Soil Conservation Service echoed the same concern: crops 
would overtake “areas [that] have the greatest potential for the production of high 
quality hardwood timber in the United States.” 46  The market value of timber had been 
excluded from the benefit-cost equations that justified Yazoo levees. Although the 
Corps had commonly boasted a six-to-one return on spending for flood construction, 
that analysis, said critics, obscured hidden expenses: the cost of future levees for 
marginal lands cleared behind federal projects, the cost of walling off natural spillways 
that cushioned the impact of floods. More costly still, said ecologists in the 1960s, 
was inevitable habitat loss. Waterfowl using the Mississippi flyway depended on what 
remained of floodplain forest. Wood ducks, especially, needed the cover of forest 
for feeding areas, nesting cavities, and brood-rearing habitat. Other dwellers in the 
vanishing forest were panthers, alligators, ivory-billed woodpeckers, Barred owls, 
Carolina chickadees, Louisiana black bears, and deer.47    
The Yazoo was also a fishery. Sport fish included sunfish, catfish, white crappie, 
blue gill, and freshwater drum. On the Big Sunflower, a tributary slated for dredging, 
biologists found mussel beds. Fish and wildlife biologist Paul Hartfield said they were 
“probably the densest accumulation of [mussel] biomass anywhere in the world. If we 
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destroy them,” said Hartfield from his office in Vicksburg, “we’ll be destroying the last 
big area of aquatic ecosystem stability in the Mississippi Delta.”48
As conservationists rallied in defense of wetlands, Mother Nature raised the stakes. 
Record high water in 1973 backed the Mississippi through Steele Bayou, reversing 
its flow. Flood works, lumbering, and erosion upstream had compromised the lower 
Yazoo’s storage capacity. Again in 1983, 1989, 1990, and 1991 the high water back-
flooded cotton plantations. Democrats who had worked against the levees were 
denounced and swept from office. In November 1991, the Magnolia State elected its 
first Republican governor since the GOP had retreated after the Civil War.49
Among the cotton towns caught in the squabble was Rolling Fork, Mississippi. 
Population 2,444, it sat on raised foundations in the flatness regularly flooded before 
the MR&T. The legendary bluesman Muddy Waters was born on a nearby plantation. 
So was Lawrence Carter, a farmer with 8,000 acres of corn, rice, cotton, and soybeans. 
Carter recounts history by flood years: 1937 when the water lapped under the piers of 
the family farmhouse, 1958 when his parents sold their cattle because the pasture was 
inundated, 1973 when the water rose slowly to build a makeshift levee, 1989 when 
Steele Bayou backed over their fields. "We need pumps,” says Carter, referring to the 
massive machines on order for the head of Steele Bayou. And we need to clean out the 
[Big] Sunflower.” Once a steamboat channel, the Big Sunflower had been snagged for 
drainage in the 1950s. When the dredges returned three decades later, the Mississippi 
Wildlife Federation and others blocked the project in court. 
Alligators lurk huge in the Big Sunflower bayous of the Yazoo drainage. Once an endangered species and 
hunted to near extinction, alligators thrive in protected wetlands, growing larger than 600 pounds.    
(William Browning)
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“Environmentalists stand in the way of progress,” says Carter. “The Corps takes 
the punishment, but we the [levee board] taxes. These projects are really ours.’’50
Just who pays and who benefits remained through the 1990s the heart of the 
Yazoo dispute. The Yazoo pumps and the Big Sunflower dredging, both killed in the 
1980s, had been revived by Sens. Thad Cochran (R-MS) and Trent Lott (R-MS) in an 
11th hour rider to the 1996 Water Resources Development Act. American Rivers and the 
Issac Walton League denounced the legislation as a 300 million dollar Mississippi farm 
subsidy. In April 1999, the Environmental Defense Fund and six other organizations 
appealed to President Clinton. Why, the EDF wanted to know, should taxes clear 
cropland for soybeans? “Why drain wetlands to increase production of crops when 
the federal government is spending $2 billion a year under a different program to do 
just the opposite—to get farmers to halt overproduction of crops in the face of falling 
prices by turning farmland back into wetlands?”51
The economic absurdity, said critics, could only be explained as a classic example 
of engineers making work for themselves. 
Good Soldiers
Steve Reed of Vicksburg District wants to give me three-cubic feet of environmental 
impact statements. “We made every attempt to do the least amount of damage,” says 
Reed, a fisheries biologist who joined the Corps about the time the green resistance 
Melvin Price Locks and Dam at Alton, Illinois (Digital Library, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
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suspended the Yazoo project. “We found ways to cut the project back and save the 
taxpayers about $47 million. We strive for balance. We want to save every possible tree.”52
To strike that natural balance, the Corps pioneers new ways of managing water. 
Construction pits are landscaped and connect to streams, attracting egrets and wood 
ducks. Corps-sponsored reforestation programs connect fragments of woodland for 
deer and bear migration. Dredging with smaller and more sophisticated equipment 
leaves curves in backwater shallow. Dredge spoil carefully spread soon sprouts 
luxuriant grass. And when approaches are insufficient, the Corps, if Congress 
provides, can purchase the land for compensatory mitigation. Such was the case with 
the Delta National Forest near Lawrence Carter’s plantation and also with the Tensas 
Refuge near Philip Brown’s rustic farm.
Reed takes pride in the changing Corps. “We’re good soldiers. We follow the 
chain of command. We do what we are told.” 
But what if the chain is knotted? What if engineers overcome with disparate 
directives follow a dangerous path that ecologists are certain is wrong? 





"We see things not as they are, but as we are," wrote the English sea-voyager 
Henry Major Tomlinson in prose close to the truth about the metaphysics of water 
in motion.1  Green crusaders saw red in scarlet flags above hundreds of Corps 
installations. Wildlife defender Michael Frome, damning dams in a 1968 contribution 
to Architectural Forum, saw a nation "in the grip of an almost psychotic fixation."2   
Journalist John McPhee saw "something special about dams, something—as 
conservation problems go—that is disproportionally and metaphysically sinister."3   
Bargemen saw mostly profit and progress, especially in the slackwater north of St. 
Louis where Congress, in 1974, agreed to impound the Father of Waters with 500,000 
cubic yards of concrete on 4,600 steel H-beams in a subaquatic cradle of Illinois 
limestone and sand. 
Melvin Price Locks and Dam, as the concrete came to be called, stood like a 
colossus bolted to bedrock in the crossroads stretch of the river where three major 
tributaries—the Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois—entered the Mississippi within 250 miles. 
Proposed in 1968, suspended in 1974, reauthorized in 1978, modified and scaled back 
after a court battle in the 1980s, the lock and dam regulated the nine-foot towboat 
channel with nine wedge-shaped 500-ton Tainter gates. Even for the Corps the project 
was massive. Enough concrete to fill the Astrodome, enough steel for 17,000 luxury 
automobiles, enough of both for 27 Gateway Arches, enough metal rod and rebar to 
wrap the planet six times, Melvin Price L&D, said tour guide Craig Smith, was at the 
time of construction "the largest civil works project in the Continental United States."4 
Lock-and-dam 
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"I know it's bigger than Hoover Dam," Smith continued. "It might not look like it, 
but most of the structure is underwater. You have 1,200 foot guide walls that are forty 
or fifty feet tall. It's a billion dollar project. Maybe `largest' refers to the cost.” 
Is bigger better? Does it mean more efficient or better designed? 
Smith paused. "I'm not sure. That's not usually part of the tour.”
Bigger was indeed implicitly better for the science-in-action tradition that 
culminated in a barge lock aptly named for a larger-than-life politician from East 
St. Louis, Congressman Melvin Price. Bigness, even in colonial times, had bonded 
government to speculative science. Jefferson had thought his tall Virginia mountains 
more elevated and sublime than any of Britain's cathedrals, and he pridefully 
proclaimed that the gigantic jaw bone of a mastodon found in the Ohio Valley was 
prophecy of a New World civilization that would soon dwarf Europe in grandeur and 
size. Size became a standard of greatness in the engineer corps that Jefferson founded. 
Committed to the massive and monumental, the Corps—a planning authority, a 
pioneer of the benefit-cost mathematics that justified big assignments—successfully 
argued the link between vigorous government and industrial growth. Corps history 
reads like an honor roll of engineering sensations. The world's largest independently 
standing coastal fortification. The world's longest masonry arch. The nation's tallest 
wave-swept lighthouse. The Washington Monument. The Capitol Dome. The ten-state 
Pick-Sloan Project along the Missouri River. Bonneville Dam. The Apollo launch pad at 
Cape Canaveral. The petrochemical freightway along the Arkansas River to Tulsa. The 
1,200-foot ship lock at Sault Ste. Marie.
"Large technology," wrote engineer Samuel Florman, a contributor to Harper's 
in 1979, "tends to promote the physical well-being of all citizens;" it was a tool of 
benevolent government and therefore "a towering force for moral good."5   But 
a counter force, Florman conceded, pulled hard from another direction. Even as 
the Corps astonished the nation with the evermore bigger and brash, the Carter 
administration was looking to cut $2.5 billion from the federal water budget and 
vowing to restructure the way Congress bankrolled its dams.6
The trouble began in west Illinois near the old landing at Alton where Lincoln had 
debated Douglas, where the port had become a symbol of the anti-slavery movement 
when five balls from a shotgun cut down the abolitionist editor Elijah P. Lovejoy while 
a mob was torching his press. Carved into the limestone bluffs above a west-east bend 
in the Mississippi, the river town was chiefly important to the history of navigation 
for benchmarks that opened and closed a confident era. It was here during the cruelest 
years of the Great Depression that the newly expanded St. Louis district first proved its 
worth to the nation with a triumph of massive construction called Lock and Dam 26; 




Lock and Dam 26—conceived in the 1920s, built with National Recovery Act 
funding from 1934 to 1938—sat in a bottleneck twenty miles below the mouth of the 
Illinois River where the tows locked through en route to Chicago or pushed south 
toward St. Louis or stair-stepped the Corps' aquatic staircase toward Minneapolis-
St. Paul. It was an artifact from a golden age of government engineering. Good for 
shipping. Good for a grain economy dependent on bulky transport. Good for the war 
effort in the Forties and the booming traffic at St. Louis during the postwar years. 
The elongated pools of the locked Mississippi, the Corps maintained, were even good 
for the ecosystem. Lock pools rescued the drought-stricken fish once stranded in 
backwater shallows. They also arrested bank erosion and created 194,000 acres of new 
lakeside habitat for wildlife, a gift from the Corps to the states.7 
For barge industry, most of all, the slackwater was the sweetest of deals: a 
29-project toll-free St. Louis to St. Paul freightway, a 9-foot river channel with a 1970 
payload of 48 million tons. In 1977 the Congressional Budget Office reported that 
waterways were the nation's most tax-subsidized mode of transportation. More than 
airports. More than railroads, pipelines, or interstate trucking. Even after user-fee and 
cost-sharing reforms of the 1980s, the federal taxpayer still paid out an estimated $500 
million a year for inland navigation, about 92 percent of the tab.8 
Barges lock through the nine-foot channel below Ford Parkway Bridge, St. Paul, about 1936 
(Historical American Engineering Survey).
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What made the deal so sweet was tax money for rehabilitation and maintenance 
that included, in 1970, a $27 million down-payment on the $400 million the Corps 
said it needed for lock replacement at Alton.  It would be the largest barge project in 
the history of the Midwest. Old Lock and Dam 26, said the Corps, was a structural 
blowout waiting to happen. Anchored to river sand, it leaked and groaned and 
vibrated on a timber foundation. The outer wall in thirty years had shifted ten inches 
downriver. A hole dug out by the current exposed a waterlogged picket of piles. "It was 
like walking in a forest," a diver recalled.9  And the project was badly situated. Wedged 
in a dangerous spot where the tows swung across the current to avoid a hump in the 
Illinois shore, the lock with its 600-foot-long main chamber had room for nine barges, 
only half the capacity of the shipping canal downstream. Electric winches and helper 
boats slowly broke down cumbersome tows as they lined up for lockage at Alton. 
"The present lock has exceeded its design capacity," said John Swift of the Waterways 
Journal, a barge industry publication.10 Barge congestion was causing 48-hour delays.11 
Barge owners said they were losing $100 an hour, $160,000 a month, and the 
railroads were delighted. Rail revenues soared, increasing about 50 percent in the 
St. Louis region during the 1960s. The Western Railroads Association predicted 
"catastrophic economic effects" if the Corps were allowed to "artificially stimulate" 
Mississippi navigation by replacing the locks at Alton.12 Why was the new project so 
enormous? Why was it being designed with two giant lock chambers and enough sill 
capacity for barges with a 12-foot draft? Because the real objective, said critics, was a 
deeper, wider, 12-foot navigation channel that would quadruple the great river's freight. 
Challenging the Corps on the grounds that rail cars were heavily taxed while 
barges were not, that big locks aggravated the sedimentation that clogged riparian 
wetlands, that they also endangered $382 million in rail revenues and 35,000 jobs, the 
railroad association, on August 6, 1974, filed suit in U.S. District Court. Twenty-one 
railroads enlisted against the Corps' ambition at Alton. The Sierra Club and the Izaak 
Walton League set aside a suspicion of railroads and signed on as well. Independently 
the improbable partners had made little headway in Congress. Together they had 
passion and clout. 
Railroads upset with subsidy? The irony was thick. Barge owners thundered 
against an estimated $700 million a year in federal support for railroads, including 
the subsidy for hauling mail, for eliminating rail crossings, for social security transfers 
to rail pensions, for Conrail stock buyouts, for bailouts and giveaways dating back to 
Cornelius Vanderbilt and the land-scheme rail scandals that tarnished President Grant. 
"Pure greed" was how St. Paul barge industrialist John W. Lambert characterized the 
railroads' position.13 Rail money was tainted money, and counterculture idealists, one 
attorney conceded, "were skittish about dealing with railroads."14 But they relented. 
Hating the Corps more than they distrusted each other, bearded ecologists and rail 
lawyers in pinstripes shared the same apocalyptic vision of a sterile, stagnant, single-
purpose towboat causeway, an Upper Mississippi remade. 
The biggest fear in the war against lock replacement was that the Corps wanted 
more for the river than any river could handle. More tows. More dredging. More 
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dredge spoil dumped into wetlands. More suspended silt in the brown plumes trailing 
behind 10,000 horsepower motors. More sedimentation in backwater channels and 
sloughs. Already the locked Mississippi had lost about a fourth of its marshy backwater, 
a federal commission reported. Old Man was rapidly aging. Lock pools had become 
catch-basins for the upland topsoil washed through the veins of commerce into the 
continent's heart.15 
Perfecting Nature
 Once there was hope that big engineering might cleanse an industrial river. 
In 1943 the top wildlife biologist at FDR's Fish and Wildlife Service published the 
astonishing claim that the locks and dams had rejuvenated the great Mississippi 
waterfowl flyway, that the health of the floodplain had "vastly improved."16  Dams 
had backed the river up over meadows. Lock pools had spread a leafy-green carpet 
of pondweed that sheltered the mallards and teals. Slackwater was also good for the 
mayflies. An excellent fish food, the mayfly nymphs rose like a fog off the impounded 
river, and they died in blankets so thick that towns cleared bridges with snowplows. 
Slow-water fish did well in the Corps-built 9-foot channel. Carp thrived. So did blue 
gill, crappie, sunfish, large-mouth bass, and northern pike.17 
Not everything prospered, of course. Not the slough-feeding pallid sturgeon. Not 
the fast-water channel-dwellers like sauger and small-mouth bass; but, as General 
Clarke took pains to explain, "There’s no use trying to perfect nature without 
disturbing it.” Clarke chided a soft generation for expecting too much:  "There were 
no trout in the Missouri River that Lewis and Clark explored up to Montana; it was 
too muddy. There were no game fish in the Colorado when Coronado gave it its name 
because of the red silt it bore.” There would always be winners and losers on a planet 
ravaged by change. "We demand that [nature] be left untouched," Clarke continued in 
a letter to Fortune. "We also expect it to be made ideal, and justify our demands on the 
fictitious ground that it once was perfect and has been spoiled.” 
Clarke's top man in St. Louis agreed that the opposition at Alton had misread 
the historical trend. "Hogwash," said Col. Guy E. Jester, a future barge lobbyist. "The 
navigation improvements [have] actually prolonged the life of this river if you look at 
the history of what has gone on."18   
Ecologists told another historical story, documenting it for the courts. In their 
history the levees had ended the floods that replenished bottomland lakes so rich with 
nutritious plankton. Dikes constrained the river and cut off the shallow places. Dams 
trapped the silt and sand that smothered the spawning beds. Another concern aired 
in the courts was the danger of channel dredging. In 1973 the state of Wisconsin used 
a NEPA injunction to suspend a suction-cutter dredge operation that, biologists said, 
dumped spoil into grassy wetlands. Two years later, in a similar action, Minnesota won 
a suit that linked dredging to river pollution. Congress then humbled the Corps with a 
1977 Clean Water Act amendment that made dredgers get permits from states.19 
"Those silly butterfly chasers," snapped an anonymous Corps official quoted in the 
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Wall Street Journal. "Those ignorant, misguided, conceited fools, they know not what 
they say."20   In the public relations campaign that followed, the Corps, said agency 
broadsides, was "the one Federal agency that has done more for natural resources 
development that any other," a "dedicated leader" of the conservation movement 
and a "pioneer" of the principle that "nature is unified and should be managed as a 
system.”21   Fish ladders and boat ramps. Nature preserves and scenic drives and 400 
water parks along 30,000 miles of public shoreline. All were cited as proof that the 
capable engineers, as one writer put it, were "taking command of the environment.”22 
Engineers, said another, "were assisting the conservation movement for many years 
before the term `environmentalism' was even coined."23
Historians greened the Corps. Lawyers distanced the river builders from the barge 
industry lobby by denying that bigger locks were the agency's ultimate goal. There 
was no official authorization to deepen the river's nine-foot channel, no sinister plan. 
But the Corps' North Central Division, reporting in 1972, had openly maintained that 
"increases in lock size and increases in channel depths from nine to twelve feet on 
the Upper Mississippi and Illinois Waterway is recognized as a distinct need.”24  Most 
of the locked Ohio was already a 12-foot channel. Support for bigger locks above 
St. Louis stretched back to a 1945 Congressional resolution and a Corps feasibility 
study completed in 1949. When Rock Island District Engineer Walter C. Gelini used 
a 1968 public meeting to detail plans for a deeper channel, a Missouri state game 
official inquired about the danger to wetlands. "The 12-foot channel is here—today or 
tomorrow," Gelini replied.25 
Back in a Washington courtroom it took Judge Charles Richey exactly a month 
to rule that fear for the system-wide impact of lock expansion was a reasonable 
concern. The pretense that plans for bigger locks were unconnected to plans for bigger 
channels was, Richey admonished, "unworthy of belief.”26  On September 6, 1974, the 
judge suspended the design work at Alton. First the Corps would have to answer to 
NEPA. If Congress wanted an oversized double lock, the Corps would have to figure 
the cost—to the railroads, to the taxpayers, to the environment—of bigger locks and 
dams up and down the system, of an Upper Mississippi with an annual cargo capacity 
of 200 million tons. 
Quickly the Corps went back to work on a supplemental EIS that considered 
the wider impact of bigger locks but arrived at the same two points: first, the danger 
to the environment was minimal; second, the old timber and concrete project was 
a hazard that should be replaced. Critics went apoplectic. Reader's Digest called big 
locks "a multibillion-dollar rip-off.”27  A 60 Minutes report implied that "big business" 
had hoodwinked "big government" into building a Taj Mahal.28  In the end it was 
all too much for Army Secretary Howard Callaway. Infamous for his part in the 
recent Waterloo over the 404 wetlands program, the secretary, on August 4, 1976, 
recommended a halfway retreat: Congress, for now, would approve just one 1,200-foot 
lock chamber at Alton. An interagency basin commission would continue to study the 
need for a second chamber and the Izaak Walton League would continue to fight it in 
court.29 
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David Slays Goliath 
The big issue left on the table was the question of user fees. Senator Pete V. 
Domenici of New Mexico still dreamed the impossible dream of a pay-as-you-go charge 
on water freight or some kind of excise tax. In an uphill battle against powerful forces—
against senators Russell B. Long of Louisiana, John C. Stennis of Mississippi, John L. 
McClennan of Arkansas, Adlai E. Stevenson III and Melvin Price of Illinois—Domenici 
backed the barge lines into a tax. Environmentalists suggested a levy of 63 cents per 
gallon of diesel oil burned on the river. Secretary Brock Adams of Carter's transportation 
department said 40 cents would suffice. Greased by more than a million dollars 
flowing to Congress from every direction, the House in 1978, voted 276 to 123 for a 
compromise that had already cleared in the Senate: a modest tax of ten cents per gallon 
would trickle into a savings account for construction, an inland waterways trust.30 
Ann Cooper of Congressional Quarterly saw David slaying Goliath. "Pete Domenici," 
cheered the reporter, "went head to head with Russell Long—and Domenici won!"31  
But Long was the silent victor. A legend in Louisiana, a cigar-chewing, word-slurring 
master of the federal tax code who, as the youngest senator ever elected, had entered 
politics in the decade after his famously clownish and dictatorial governor-father had 
been martyred by a single gunshot, Senator Russell Billiu Long retained the family gift 
for seeing where the nation was headed and wading in with the flow. Long guarded a 
quiet respect for the renegade Domenici. Although the two politicians were a wet-and-
dry study in contrast—one a barge Democrat from the soggiest state in the Union, the 
other a rail Republican from the most arid of states—both Long and Domenici sat on 
the Senate finance committee, and there after months of arcane debate they bristled at 
the arrogance of the water-freight lobbyists who, conceding nothing, had stonewalled 
the tax agreement already approved by the House. 
New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici, left, and Louisiana Senator Russell Long.  
(Madeline Marshall /The Learning Tree).  
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"We're going to pass you a bill," Long assured Domenici.32  And the 95th  
Congress delivered . . . but not before the arm-twister from Baton Rouge and House 
Speaker Tip O'Neill knifed into the user-fee concept, removing its fiscal heart. Ten cents 
was token taxation. There would be no pay-as-you-go provision, no attempt to recover 
any significant portion of the lock project's actual cost.
The Long-Domenici agreement was tentative yet richly symbolic, a preview of the 
fiscal retrenchment that softened the Corps to reform. In 1980 President Jimmy Carter 
asked the House to suspend 125 water projects even as the contractors began driving 
the H-beams for the technological marvel later named Melvin Price. The following year 
a drought choked navigation. The Grain and Feed Association of Illinois, complaining 
of crippling delays where the barges queued up at Alton, blamed the imperfect river 
for international food inflation. The Sierra Club of Wisconsin called it a "troubled 
resource.”  
As a mix of the old and the new filtered from Reagan's White House—tax cuts, 
cost-sharing, environmental rollbacks—the Corps' constituency made do with less.  
In 1983 the Lower Mississippi Flood Control Association reluctantly shaved $100 
million off a $400 million request for levees and a pumping station. In 1984 the  
Corps spent less on construction than maintenance—a historic first. 
A half century had passed since the wedding-cake side wheeler watchmen marked 
twain north of St. Louis, two centuries since Congress, in 1787, had stipulated that 
the inland waterways "shall be common highways and forever free . . . without any 
tax, impost, or duty.”33  The army's most brilliant technicians had in those formative 
A biologist counts mussels at a University of Iowa riverside research station, 2010.  
(University of Iowa LACMRERS)
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years matted and snagged about 27,000 miles of navigable watercourses. Elevating 
government, they had pioneered a place for the schooled expert as a policy insider. 
Embracing a builder's faith in water as a pathway to progress, they were seldom 
politically neutral, yet good engineers well understood that logrolling for levees and 
locks was a ritual reserved for elected officials, a political rite. Dutiful service to a 
free-spending Congress had built, since 1936, more than 1,500 waterway projects. 
It had prevented at least $150 billion in flood damage, and that, according to Corps 
accounting, was a payback of 7 to 1. The engineers had remade the Mississippi into the 
spine of a 14,000-mile transport network that moved, annually, more than two billion 
waterborne tons.34 
Waterways as a public investment. Waterways as federal aid to factories and farms. 
Once Americans had mostly trusted their lock and dam organization to strive for 
a more perfect union by fixing small imperfections in God's near-perfect Earth. No 
longer. The politics of big engineering had shifted in the storm over Alton. Suddenly 
the foundation seemed hollow. 
An Environmental Ethic
T. S. Eliot said it best:  "The river is a strong brown god . . . Sullen, untamed, . . . 
useful, untrustworthy, . . . Keeping his seasons in rages, destroyer, reminder of what 
men chose to forget."35
What men chose to forget in the heat of the battle at Alton was that Corps 
engineering had always been more than conquest and human contrivance. There 
had always been romance, even regret, in the scientific mind of the army; in the 
wanderlust of topographer John C. Frémont who paused atop snow-capped peaks to 
contemplate noble insects; in the remorse of Yellowstone explorer William F. Reynolds 
who protested "the entire extinction" of America's buffalo herds; in the Faustian 
anguish of postwar Chief Engineer Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., who built the monumental 
but pined, nevertheless, for the mossy stream in the pungent forest, the lost wood of 
his youth. "Man cannot dominate," Sturgis insisted in 1953.36  Addressing a Milwaukee 
convention of fish and game commissioners even as the Corps was elsewhere selling 
the "unified plan to convert a wild and destructive river into a tame and beneficial 
one," Sturgis, looking forward, looking backward, straddled the distance between what 
engineering had done for the nation and what the future repenting republic would 
make engineering become.37  
It was not faith in the gospel of progress that unsettled a builder like Sturgis. It was 
blind faith. 
"All of us here at the Corps in one way or another have taken on an 
environmental ethic," said Lt. General Henry Hatch, the Corps' 47th commander. 
Hatch had won his command in the wake of 1986 court-ordered compromise that 
pledged $190 million for habitat restoration. The quid-pro-quo was Congressional 
authorization for a second, albeit smaller, lock chamber at Melvin Price. Hatch seized 
a magnanimous moment to concede that yesterday's engineers had, perhaps, taken 
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a too narrow view of the national interests. Greener and wiser, the Corps would now 
embrace "an ethic of environmental sustainability;" it would "look beyond the law, and 
well beyond past practices, to see how we might apply our skills to solving the world's 
environmental problems—and how we might make our work more environmentally 
sound.” Eco-engineering would become a "Pearl Harbor" to rescue the planet. Tree 
planting, marsh building, wildlife preserves, beach restoration, wastewater treatment, 
toxic waste clean-up, dredge spoil research, and a vastly expanded wetlands permitting 
program would soon make the Corps, said Hatch, the "world leader" of green 
innovation. Nation builders would "take command of the environment," returning 
manscape to landscape and restoring a sustainable Earth.38  
Dislodged from its bend in the river, searching for mission and purpose, the Corps, 
said The Washington Post, had pulled off "the ultimate bureaucratic miracle.”39  Even 
former adversaries like Norah Deakin Davis, an author who had hammered the Corps 
with nostalgia for rushing rivers, came away cautiously optimistic after meetings 
with Hatch. "The Army Engineers want to shed their old image and become the good 
guys," wrote Davis in American Forests.40  The nation builders, it seemed, had learned to 
think cosmically about the impact of single projects on thousand-mile river systems. 
Less arrogant, they had "partnered" with fish and game agencies and environmental 
clients. More imaginative, they had cut V-notches into rock dikes to rescue the murky 
pools from backwater sedimentation. They had built perches for eagles, islands 
for shorebirds. They had scored miles of skinny grooves into concrete river-bank 
Rock dikes with cuts or “notches” diversity slack water, creating shallows and contours.  
(St. Louis District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
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revetment so that insects and protozoa could better sustain the aquatic food chain. 
They had rolled out a soft, green carpet of marsh grass by fluctuating the water levels 
behind Corps locks and dams. "The whistle has blown and the army has wheeled," 
wrote Hope Babcock, an Audubon Society critic.41  In 1992 the Corps spent $260 
million on so-called environmental projects, about 8 percent of its $3.3 billion budget 
for civil works.42
Yet the weight of another tradition still drove the construction giant. "Engineers 
can be imaginative, risk-taking people, but most of the time," wrote science journalist 
Robert Pool, "they color inside the lines.”43 Engineers clung to tradition because risk 
invited disaster, because their positivism grated against the gloom of biological science, 
because material progress through water construction was still their fundamental 
reason for being. Even disarmingly earnest General Hatch was realist enough to 
admit "that [environmental compliance] doesn't mean I'm going to destroy the 
economics of a project that is needed for economic reasons by overburdening it with 
the environmental aspects.”44 Hatch still had to believe that engineering would fix 
engineering. He still thought builders should build. More coastal marsh? The Corps 
would use dredge material to shore the sinking lowlands. More wet prairie? The Corps 
would build a prairie educational center in the very shadow of its biggest lock. 
In these ways the Mississippi Corps remained an agency in-between: between the 
promise and peril of technological modernization, between Hamiltonian commitment 
Bass fishing thrives below Melvin Price on mudflats replanted as marsh. (Missouriflies.com) 
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to industrial progress and Jeffersonian longing for the greener, older, more erratic and 
chaste Mississippi lost to the industrial age. "We tried to stay in the middle," said Owen 
Dutt of the St. Louis District, a planning chief who spent more than a decade in the 
thick of the fight over Melvin Price. "It was the wild-eyed environmentalists versus 
the American Way—that's how the shippers saw it.” Did the Corps manage to remain 
impartial? "We thought so but the courts said otherwise. In retrospect, I guess they 
were right."45 
Dutt makes the essential point about the in-between organization. Bureaucracy 
seeking the middle ground might still take a position. And that is why the ideology of 
the Corps still rises off the river like mayflies: in Vicksburg where an engineer refused 
to concede that levees and dams had subsidized agriculture; in Alton where I was 
informed that the Corps had "built" Yellowstone; in St. Louis where an expert said the 
Corps had rescued a forested river degraded by wood-burning steamboats; in Memphis 
where a public relations man said the agency had been an environmental crusader 
since the time of Lewis and Clark. 
It takes distance to see ideology. Historical distance. Only in retrospect is it 
possible to understand how inextricably environmentalism has become intertwined 
with the strands of two different dogmas. One is the hopeful view that engineering 
might yet revive a vanishing landscape. The other holds that humanity can never 
replicate the rhythms of nature and our safest course is never to try.
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